Huddersfield Daily Examiner : Into the Long War

Thursday, September 07, 2006

Into the Long War

As a new study reveals that attacks by the resurgent Taliban have raised the death rate of coalition soldiers in Afghanistan to double that during the invasion of Iraq, Dr PAUL ROGERS, of Kirkburton, Professor of Peace Studies at Bradford University, looks at the conflict

By The Huddersfield Daily Examiner | September 7, 2006

LAST weekend's loss of an RAF Nimrod patrol aircraft and its crew, combined with the further deaths of British soldiers yesterday and a sudden upsurge in fighting in Helmand province, have all raised concerns about what is happening in Afghanistan.

Many people expected that the termination of the Taliban regime nearly five years ago would mean that Afghanistan would no longer be a country of concern, and would be able to make the transition to peace for the first time in nearly three decades.

Instead, the past few months have seen a Taliban revival that is causing concern around the world and may suggest that the 2001 war is actually far from over.

Some analysts were predicting a Taliban resurgence last summer, but that did not happen, almost certainly because the Taliban were developing their capabilities and planning for the longer term.

Instead, it has been this year that has seen the upsurge, most worryingly with Taliban units able to operate in groups of a hundred or more, in marked contrast to their much smaller-scale activities in recent years.

Why have they been able to make such a comeback?

There are four main reasons. The first is that they were never really defeated back in 2001. While the regime was certainly terminated, the great majority of the Taliban supporters melted away into their towns and villages, mostly with their weapons intact.

Secondly, they have been able to re-group in the border districts of Pakistan, especially North and South Waziristan, where the Pakistani Army has little control, and use these districts as bases for building up their supplies, weapons and transit routes.

When American forces have staged air raids across the border this has resulted in intense anti-Americanism in Pakistan, especially when civilians have been killed, so the Taliban have had considerable freedom to operate.

Thirdly, the government of President Karzai has been far less effective than expected, particularly in the southern provinces where the Taliban have made such inroads.

There may have been a building boom in the capital, Kabul, some of the other northern towns and cities are doing better, and many more children are going to school, particularly girls.

At the same time there has been endemic corruption and lack of justice and security across the south of the country, adding to bitter criticism of the government.

Finally, the attempt to control opium production has been a conspicuous failure, with this year's crop being the largest ever.

Moreover, most of the opium is now processed into heroin and morphine within Afghanistan, in marked contrast to 10 years ago, and this means far more illicit money is pouring into the country.

Much of it ends up in the hands of the Taliban and other militia who use it to pay guerrillas and buy weapons and supplies.

Behind all of this is a real failure that has to be laid at the door of the Americans, British and their Western European allies.

When the Taliban regime was terminated in 2001, some of the UN's top experts said that this was the once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to help the country achieve peace, but it would require a great deal of help, especially for the first few years, coupled with the immediate deployment of a large peace-keeping force of around 30,000 troops to prevent a Taliban resurgence and ensure the kind of security that would aid development.

The problem was that by early 2002, the United States already had its eye on Iraq and was simply not prepared to commit the resources that Afghanistan needed.

Britain and some other countries did a bit better, but the overwhelming view of independent analysts was that it simply wasn't enough - for example, barely 5,000 peacekeeping troops were provided, a fraction of what was required.

Four years later we face the prospect of a war stretching over many years and an Afghanistan that is slipping back into widespread violence.

There may still be time to prevent this if Afghanistan can get the all round help that it desperately needs, but the mistakes made nearly five years ago were quite fundamental, and they are now coming back to haunt us.

* Paul Rogers' new book, Into the Long War, will be published by Pluto Press in November.