Daily Times : Barbarians at the gate

Barbarians at the gate

by Cyril Almeida | January 26, 2008

Other than the recently slain Bhutto, Musharraf is the only other figure who has consistently warned of the militant’s threat to the state of Pakistan. The problem is that he suffers from an utter lack of credibility in the eyes of the public. In politics, the messenger is often equally, if not more, important as the message

Who killed Benazir Bhutto? Sky’s the limit as far as theories go. But the most obvious one is also the least talked about: that Bhutto’s death was a major victory for militants in a creeping war against the state of Pakistan that gained real, frightening momentum in 2007.

Why the media and the public have largely focussed on the complicity of the status apparatus, or elements within it, in the killing of Bhutto is a triumph of the past over the present. Disillusionment with the state — the feeling of disenfranchisement and economic dismay — over many years has contributed to popular resentment against the shadowy ‘establishment’ and its security apparatus. It is easier to believe state complicity than suspect the militants’ hand.

The problem with this approach, however, is that it looks right past the greatest danger to the state of Pakistan since 1971. It is not difficult to imagine militants spread across the length of the country rubbing their hands in glee as they look on while the state once again goes to war against itself: attritional warfare in various parts of the country; political parties in disarray; the army on the back foot and a discredited political force; a public that wants change but does not know of what type; and the US as a renewed bugbear.

Few facts have been established of the circumstances of Bhutto’s death, but we do at least know the following: a man aimed a pistol at Bhutto; three shots were heard; and immediately after a blast took the life of the man with the pistol. Whether there was one attacker or two or more and what exactly caused the death of Bhutto, this much is in little doubt: the bomb near Bhutto’s vehicle was triggered by someone who believed he was acting in the name of religion.

The problem for the public is that a full, honest appraisal of those with motive to kill Bhutto is immediately enveloped in a cloud of fog. The shades of grey in which it is difficult to parse the state, its proxies and its enemies are not susceptible to easy analysis or glib sound-bites and headlines. Moreover, the people’s princess being killed at the behest of a cabal of insiders is too irresistible a story-line to pass up.

This is not to exonerate the establishment of all culpability. Indeed, few doubt the links between the state and the militants who are operating with increasing boldness across the country. The real issue is, however, subtler: has Frankenstein’s monster grown out of control or can it be reined in at will? The media and the public have passed judgement already: it is the latter.

But what if it is the former; if Lal Masjid, itself inextricably linked to the state, was a turning point last year? Have the militants since decided to press ahead in their bid to destabilise Pakistan? From within Pakistan it is easy to dismiss the Americans, the UN and ElBaradei who increasingly voice doomsday scenarios. But have they identified a subtle shift in a war that few Pakistanis are willing to acknowledge?

Spooks and establishment figures in Pakistan are quick to point out that neither the Taliban nor the tribes in FATA posed any threat to Pakistan until the US insisted the government purge them of the Islamic militants in their midst. The problem with this theory is that it is akin to nurturing a nest of snakes in your backyard and then being surprised when they slip in the house and bite your dog or child. Pakistan is now experiencing the quintessential blowback, and yet few care to acknowledge this fact.

This is dangerous. The media bears much responsibility: Maulana Fazlullah, Baitullah Mehsud, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Chechens, Rashid Rauf, the Lal Masjid brothers — all names bandied about with ease, but little context. Few care to explore the aims of these militants. Fazlullah’s band of militants were scattered with ease in the first wave of army operations and the media cheered rapturously. Was anyone surprised that the army had to mount a second phase of attacks a few weeks later? With few exceptions, try finding any hint in the media of protracted guerrilla warfare in the area after the first phase.

And then there is the demobbed general who occupies the presidency. Other than the recently slain Bhutto, Musharraf is the only other figure who has consistently warned of the militant’s threat to the state of Pakistan. The problem is that he suffers from an utter lack of credibility in the eyes of the public. In politics, the messenger is often equally, if not more, important as the message. So long as Musharraf remains the dominant political player in the country, his assessment of the militant threat will be tainted by his other sins.

The president has steadfastly maintained his ‘Pakistan first’ line; perhaps it is time he realises that the best thing he can do to save the country is to let someone else take the reins.

Cyril Almeida is a lawyer in Karachi. He can be reached at cyril.a@gmail.com