Atlantic Free Press : 9/11 Mind Swell

9/11 Mind Swell

by Joel S. Hirschhorn | August 13, 2009

As we approach the eighth anniversary of 9/11 consider this paradox. In the post 9-11 years the scientific evidence for disbelieving the official government story has mounted incredibly. And the number of highly respected and credentialed professionals challenging the official story has similarly expanded. Yet, to the considerable disappointment of the international 9/11 truth movement, the objective fact is that there are no widespread, loud demands for a new government-backed 9/11 investigation. The 9/11 truth movement is the epitome of a marginalized movement, one that never goes away despite not achieving truly meaningful results, which in this case means replacing official lies with official truth. What has gone wrong?

Akin to the definition of insanity, the hallmark of entrenched but marginalized movements is that they continue to pursue exactly the same strategy and tactics that have failed to produce solid results. They indulge themselves with self-delusion, defensive thinking and acting as if the world at large must surely and finally wake up, see the light and embrace the Truth. Years and, potentially, decades go by, but this quixotic status quo remains embedded, as if set in intellectual concrete. There is no brain tumor to blame. Nor any mass hypnosis of true believers to prove. There is just monumental disinterest among the dominant culture, political establishment and the broad public that is far more engaged with other issues, problems and movements.

The 9/11 truth movement, at best, gets meager public attention when it is derided and insulted, used as an example of persistent conspiratorial insanity.

Make no mistake; I concluded a few years back, after using my professional engineering and materials science background to study the evidence, that the official government story is a lie. As a former full professor of engineering, I firmly believe that elements of the US government were involved with contributing to (not just allowing) the 9/11 tragedy, but that does not necessarily eliminate the role of those terrorists publicly blamed for the events. Science, logic, evidence and critical thinking told me this.

Who should we blame for the failure of the 9/11 truth movement to fix the historical record and, better yet, identify those in the government who turned 9/11 into an excuse for going to war, getting them indicted, prosecuted, and punished for their murderous acts?

It is too easy to blame the mainstream media and political establishment for refusing to demand and pursue a truly comprehensive and credible independent scientific and engineering investigation. President Obama with his tenacious belief in looking forward, not backward, exemplifies a national mindset to avoid the painful search for truth and justice that could produce still more public disillusionment with government and feed the belief that American democracy is weak at best, and delusional at worst.

Marginalized movements always face competition for public attention. There are always countless national issues and problems that feed new movements and distract the public. There have been many since 9/11, not the least of which was the last presidential campaign and then the painful economic recession, and now the right wing attacks on health care reform. The 9/11 truth movement illustrates a total failure to compete successfully with other events and movements.

This can be explained in several ways. The 9/11 movement has not been able to articulate enough benefits to the public from disbelieving the official government story and pursuing a new investigation. What might ordinary Americans gain? Would proof-positive of government involvement make them feel better, more secure, and more patriotic? Apparently not. In fact, just the opposite. By its very nature, the 9/11 issue threatens many things by discovering the truth: still less confidence in the US political system, government and public officials. Still more reason to ponder the incredible loss of life and national wealth in pursuing the Iraq war. In other words, revealing 9/11 truth offers the specter of a huge national bummer. Conversely, it would show the world that American democracy has integrity.

The second explanation for failure is that the truth movement itself is greatly to blame. It has been filled with nerdish, ego-centric and self-serving activists (often most interested in pushing their pet theory) unable to pursue strategies designed to face and overcome ugly, challenging realities. The truth movement became a cottage industry providing income and meaning for many individuals and groups feeding the committed with endless websites, public talks, videos, books and paraphernalia. They habitually preach to the choir. Applause substitutes for solid results. In particular, it embraces the simplistic (and obviously ineffective) belief that by revealing technical, scientific and engineering facts and evidence the public and political establishment would be compelled to see the light. Darkness has prevailed.

Proof of this are the views expressed days ago on the truth movement by Ben Cohen on the Huffington Post: “I have done some research on the topic, but stopped fairly quickly into when it dawned on me that: 1. Any alternative to the official account of what happened is so absurd it simply cannot be true. 2. No reputable scientific journal has ever taken any of the 'science' of the conspiracy seriously. 3. The evidence supporting the official story is overwhelming, whereas the 9/11 Truthers have yet to produce a shred of concrete evidence that members of the U.S. government planned the attacks in New York and Washington.” Similarly, in the London Times James Bone recently said a “gruesome assortment of conspiracy theorists insists that the attacks on the US of September 11, 2001 were an inside job. It is easy to mock this deluded gang of ageing hippies, anarchists and anti-Semites.” Truthers continue to face a very steep uphill battle.

A common lie about the truth movement is that there have been no credible scientific articles in peer reviewed journals supporting it. But those opposing the truth movement will and do find ways to attack whatever scientific evidence is produced and published. It takes more than good science and facts for the movement to succeed.

Besides the movement having too many genuine crackpots (possibly trying to subvert it), a larger problem is what has been missing from it: effective political strategies. Besides pushing scientific results and more credible supporters, it did nothing successful to make a new 9/11 investigation a visible issue in the last presidential campaign. It did nothing effective to put pressure on a new, Democrat controlled congress to consider legislation providing the authorization and funding for a new, credible investigation. It seems that people who want to blame the government are often unable to also see the political path forward that requires the government to fund a new investigation.

To its credit, Architects and Engineers for 9/11 Truth does have a petition aimed at Congress, demanding a new investigation, but has fewer than 5,000 signers. The petition effort in New York City to get a new investigation is commendable, with just under 75,000 signers, but national action is needed. Pragmatically, both efforts are unimpressive compared to other campaigns seeking political action. To get both media attention and political support the movement needs a hundred times more documented supporters, willing to do a lot more than sign a petition.

The tenth anniversary of 9/11 will come fast. The opportunity is making 9/11 an issue in the 2012 presidential campaign. The least delusional and defensive in the truth movement should think deeply and seriously on what needs to change to accomplish the prime goal: having an official investigation that compels most people and history to accept the truth, no matter how painful it is, including the possibility that it finds no compelling evidence for government involvement.


Contact Joel S. Hirschhorn through delusionaldemocracy.com

Reuters : Iraq's second energy auction late Nov-Oil Ministry

Iraq's second energy auction late Nov-Oil Ministry

July 30, 2009

BAGHDAD, July 30 (Reuters) - Iraq will hold an auction for its second major bidding round for energy fields at the end of November, the Oil Ministry spokesman said on Thursday.

Spokesman Asim Jihad also said that a new acting director had been named to head Iraq's state-run South Oil Company, after Fayad al-Nema, a critic of the ministry's plans for an initial bidding round giving foreign firms a chance to develop oilfields already in production, was removed from his post this week.

"Dhiya Jaafar was the head of the southern operations commission of the South Oil Company and he became head of the company," Jihad said. The government said Nema was removed for reasons related to 'restructuring' at the Oil Ministry.

(Reporting by Missy Ryan; editing by James Jukwey)

© Thomson Reuters 2009 All rights reserved

Financial Times : Critic of Iraq's oil plan transferred

Critic of Iraq's oil plan transferred

By Anna Fifield | July 30, 2009

Iraq yesterday removed the director of its state-run South Oil Company, Fayad al-Nema, who had previously criticised the government's plans to auction large oil and gas fields, a spokesman said. He has been transferred to a different job at the ministry in Baghdad. No replacement was named.

Anna Fifield, Beirut | Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009

AFP : Iraq fires head of state-owned oil company

Iraq fires head of state-owned oil company

AFP | July 30, 2009

BAGHDAD — The Iraqi government has fired the head of state-owned South Oil Company (SOC), who publicly criticised Baghdad's auctioning off of oil and gas fields to foreign energy giants, an oil ministry spokesman said on Thursday.

Fayadh Hassan Nima was replaced as SOC's chief executive by the head of the company's department of oil fields, Dia Jaafar, ministry spokesman Assem Jihad said.

"The oil ministry and the government are always looking for ways to improve administration of the oil sector," Jihad said, referring to the reasons Nima was dismissed.

Nima had loudly protested the public auction for six giant oil fields and two major gas fields, arguing that the SOC should be given the task of exploiting the fields in southern Iraq with only technical assistance from foreign companies.

Baghdad held the sale at the end of June, but reached agreement on only one of the fields, with the government facing accusations that the sale had been a failure.

It was the first time Iraq's oil industry was opened up to foreign companies since its nationalisation four decades ago.

Copyright © 2009 AFP. All rights reserved.

Sky News : Captain Removed After Slamming Afghan War

Captain Removed After Slamming Afghan War

August 14, 2009

A British Army captain who anonymously wrote a scathing attack about the Afghan war has been removed from his unit, Sky News understands.

The unnamed officer wrote the emotive article in Monday's Independent newspaper.

"My motivation is simple" he said.

"Writing this helps vent off some of the frustration at what is happening out here in Afghanistan to those serving in the British Army, where death and serious injury are sickeningly common occurrences."

The officer, who has been in the Army for eight years, is likely to be brought back from Afghanistan and faces disciplinary action and a possible court martial.

It is thought he was identified because he revealed the unit he was serving with - the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards Battle Group.

He wrote in detail about coping with the loss of fellow soldiers and the injuries sustained by many more.

"I am talking about limbs removed, double or even triple amputations, on a scale that we've never seen before," he said.

Serving members of the Armed forces are banned from speaking to the media without prior agreement from the Ministry of Defence.

But just this month, new guidelines were drawn up by the Government which encouraged soldiers to talk about their work online.

An MoD press release read: "Service and MoD personnel are being encouraged to talk about themselves and their work online within new guidelines which give advice on how they can protect their security, reputation and privacy."

But the guidelines also clearly state that any communication with the media "must be referred, through the line manager/chain of command".

The captain clearly breached a number of these guidelines.

He gained no authorisation before writing the article, he questioned the purpose of the mission in Afghanistan, and he complained of a lack of equipment.

In his article he also said: "Then there are the equipment shortages. Due to the pitiful numbers of support helicopters and Apaches needed to escort them, every day troops on the ground are forced to expend an enormous amount of hours and manpower just standing still."

He concluded the article with: "We seem to know and say that it is not worth it, whilst instinctively reacting and saying that it is worth it - it has to be worth it.

"If I am honest, I do not know what I think about it all conclusively; my reasoning is lost in the storm of media, opinions, analysis that are at play here."

It is understood that he already had plans to leave the Army soon.

WSJ : Killing of Militant Shows Cementing U.S.-Pakistan Ties

Killing of Militant Shows Cementing U.S.-Pakistan Ties

By GERALD F. SEIB | August 14, 2009

The headlines a few days ago told a seemingly simple story, of a missile strike launched from an American drone that killed Pakistan's top Taliban leader.

But that missile strike, in Pakistan's remote South Waziristan province, did more than kill one terrorist thug, a man named Baitullah Mehsud. The attack may well have cemented a much tighter U.S.-Pakistani bond in the broader fight against Islamic extremism.

If so, that represents a significant development and quite a change from just a few months ago. At that time, it was easy to cruise around Washington and find U.S. officials who would complain that Pakistani officials weren't taking the threat they faced from the Taliban seriously enough and were balking at real cooperation with the U.S. in fighting it.

In one of the big and underappreciated stories of the year, that has turned around. Starting early this year, there was a marked pickup in an officially unacknowledged program in which Pakistani and American intelligence officials cooperate to pinpoint Taliban and al Qaeda leaders and strongholds, then strike at them from unmanned Predator drones under American control.

One by one, the U.S. and Pakistan, in this new partnership, have been seeking out a list of some 20 high-value al Qaeda and Taliban leaders. More than half of them now have been killed or captured.

The strike against Mr. Mehsud illustrates how far the program has come and may open the way for deeper cooperation. (Some Taliban spokesmen have insisted since that Mr. Mehsud wasn't actually killed in the strike, but both U.S. and Pakistani officials are confident he was.)

Indeed, a similar missile strike in the same region was launched Tuesday, reportedly targeting another Taliban compound.

For their part, American officials describe the strike as a sign of much better cooperation between two intelligence agencies, Pakistan's ISI security services and America's Central Intelligence Agency. Those two have tended to view each other with a healthy degree of mutual suspicion.

The CIA has long thought the ISI harbored agents sympathetic with Islamic extremists. The ISI viewed the CIA as an organization with too little appreciation for the nuances of the fight against Islamic extremism.

But the combination of a new Pakistani president, Asif Ali Zardari, and a new Pakistani army chief of staff, Ashfaq Kayani, has changed the atmosphere.

Despite deep initial American doubts about Mr. Zardari's commitment and courage, and uncertainty about the attitude of Mr. Kayani, they have cleared the way for greater, if still-quiet, cooperation.

U.S. officials say that intelligence on the whereabouts of extremist leaders increasingly is shared in real time and that a system for making decisions on when to strike them has become sleeker.

Pakistan often condemns American airstrikes in public, to deflect charges that it is allowing U.S. forces free rein, but the pattern of attacks in the past six months bespeaks a high level of cooperation, which pleases the Obama administration.

More important, though, may be the effect the Mehsud attack has on Pakistani attitudes.

Previously, Pakistani officials suspected that their American partners were far more interested in hunting for targets of concern to the U.S. -- principally al Qaeda leaders and the camps they used to plot attacks on American targets in neighboring Afghanistan -- rather than those Pakistani officials viewed as most directly threatening them.

Mr. Mehsud, though, was the terrorist leader at the top of Pakistan's most-wanted list; he was, after all, thought to be behind the 2007 assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.

Hence, the complex effort to track him down and take him out had more to do with eliminating a threat to Pakistan's government than with making the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan easier.

As a result, this attack, unlike many other Predator strikes, was met with general public approval in Pakistan. Now one Pakistani official says it will open "a new era of trust between the two intelligence services."

We'll have to see, of course, and suspicions about motives and intentions on both sides won't go away overnight or because of one success.

There also are some analysts who think the Predator strikes, by arousing anger among Pakistanis sympathetic to the Taliban and antagonistic toward the U.S., may do as much long-term harm as good.

Still, U.S. officials consider the strike both a milestone in its own right, as well as an event that might have a positive spillover on the effort to stabilize Afghanistan next door.

While Mr. Mehsud was principally focused on making trouble in Pakistan, he had experience fighting in Afghanistan as well, and he had a network of supporters there.

Perhaps more important, U.S. officials think he was instrumental in facilitating cross-border traffic between Taliban groups on both sides of the border and also helped al Qaeda fighters move back and forth.

To the extent the Mehsud organization now is disrupted or locked in a succession struggle, that can't be bad for U.S. efforts.

More broadly, while Pakistan remains a nation with deep problems, and one facing manifold threats, a simple missile strike has offered at least a glimmer of good news, for Pakistani officials and for America's own long struggle in the region..

Write to Gerald F. Seib at jerry.seib@wsj.com

Independent : 'There is no refuge, no place to go to deal with your grief'

'There is no refuge, no place to go to deal with your grief'

In the first ever unauthorised dispatch from an officer on the frontline, one young Captain offers a brutally honest account of life in Afghanistan, revealing the pain of losing comrades, the frustration at the lack of equipment, and the sense that the conflict seems unending and, at times, unwinnable

author's name withheld | August 10, 2009

My motivation is simple. Writing this helps vent off some of the frustration at what is happening out here in Afghanistan to those serving in the British Army, where death and serious injury are sickeningly common occurrences.

Before coming here, I had done two tours in Iraq which saw fierce fighting against the enemy. But, sometimes out here I feel I might as well be on my first tour, as a novice second lieutenant instead of a so-called senior captain with over eight years experience in the Army, due to a shocking rate of attrition that I have never encountered before.

Commentators keep citing previous figures for casualty rates in the Falkland's conflict, as well as the years in Northern Ireland, suggesting that, spread over the time we have been in Afghanistan, the figures here are not that bad.

How reassuring. For a moment I thought the rates might be quite bad; but thank goodness I have been shown that what we are experiencing is in fact a tolerable "medium" number of casualties.

Can we really only analyse the death and injury rate, or view it as a cause for concern, once we get past a certain benchmark or once the average number outstrips a previous average? I had hoped that human progression was a bit more advanced than that, and that there might be more to the situation than a comparison of statistics.

Then there are the injuries. I am talking about limbs removed, double or even triple amputations, on a scale that we've never seen before.

When you read about a "very seriously injured" casualty, that person's life is never going to be the same, nor is it for the rest of their family, who will be sucked in and forever affected by the aftermath.

So what effect does this have on us all out in Afghanistan? My experience of this is from the 1st Battalion Welsh Guard's Battle Group, who have endured a significant number of fatalities and seriously injured personnel, including the death of their commanding officer.

With each death I think each of us experiences a feeling of total shock, powerlessness and impotence. Within your mind you feel you have to do something, especially if you knew the individual. Back at home that might be to jump in the car and drive to some secluded spot where you can get out and scream at the top of your lungs to let out all the anguish. But here nothing of the sort is possible. You are all enclosed within your camp or patrol base; there is no refuge, no private corner to go to, to deal with your grief.

Around you everything else has to continue, and cannot stop. The radios still have to be manned and answered, the patrols still have to be planned, the convoys have to be organised. It is not as if you can take a day off to deal with the grief, to come to terms with it. And even if you could, what good would that do?

Who wants to go and sit in their tent, sweating in temperatures in the high 40s, brooding on the possibilities: what were they thinking in those last few moments, did they know what had happened, did they know they were dying, how terrified and alone did they feel?

The only option available is to embrace the alternative: keep joking with your friends, maintain the banter levels, swapping smutty jokes and stories – literally forcing yourself to keep smiling.

I do not say that as a praiseworthy example of that renowned, age-old, plucky, English stiff upper lip. Far from it – it may be our worst enemy.

After death, life obviously has to go on, but I have always felt that life should go on having learnt a lesson from that death, improving your life as a testament to that life robbed – not merely moving on with a smile, whilst showing "fortitude".

I am just speaking for those of us who deal with the deaths and injuries in Afghanistan indirectly, as an explosion in the distance, followed by a report on the radio, then a helicopter coming in to pick up the casualty.

As for those who deal directly with the deaths and injuries, who have to go into the Viking vehicles after the explosion to pull out the casualties, who have to tourniquet the remaining stumps after both the legs of a person have been blown off, those who have to pick up the leftover pulpy fragments of a disintegrated body and put them into a bag, I am not sure how they react.

I would imagine in a similar way to the rest of us: you put it aside as soon as you can, as there is nothing to be achieved in thinking about it. All you will do is think yourself into a corner, where you are faced with the absurdity and horrid waste of it all. And if you let that take a hold, how are you meant to perform, drag yourself out of your tent at 4am after just three hours sleep, to go on another foot patrol, another 18-hour convoy, another 12-hour shift in the operations room? It does not work.

There is so much that still needs to be done, there are still weeks to get through, more patrols and convoys that need to be completed. So the event of each death is placed away, zipped up in a mental body bag, back in the recesses of your mind.

However, unlike a real body bag, which fortunately disappears, that mental body bag remains in the morgue of your sub-conscious, quite possibly to come out and be re-opened, once you return home and have the chance to think about each death, each injury, each friend gone.

Then there are the equipment shortages. Due to the pitiful numbers of support helicopters and Apaches needed to escort them, every day troops on the ground are forced to expend an enormous amount of hours and manpower just standing still. They sacrifice their reserves of energy, motivation and willpower securing and picketing routes for the never-ending vehicle convoys that have to keep happening in order to resupply the patchy spread of patrol bases with water, ammo and rations; as well as recovering the vehicles that invariably go into ditches and securing helicopter landing-sites for the evacuation of casualties from improvised explosive device strikes.

I think if Sisyphus (the Greek mythological character cursed to roll a huge boulder repeatedly up a hill, only to watch it roll back down again, throughout eternity) could see us now, he would offer his sincere condolences and offer a friendly arm around the shoulder, saying that he knew what it felt like.

If someone provided one of those garishly coloured (army) pie charts depicting the percentage of time and effort sucked up into the black hole of orchestrating these road moves, it would provide a statistic that would be both shocking and embarrassing. It might also partly explain why the military is struggling to gain an advantage over the Taliban and cannot hold a significant amount of ground. Its energy, time and focus is bound up with those road moves, and our most vital asset, our troops, are either sweating on the sides of the roads, securing them, or sweating inside the vehicles of those often doomed convoys. I am not criticising the military on the ground, who have to deal with this dilemma. Everyone seems to already agree on this issue of the equipment, in particular the lack of support helicopters – which rather begs the question of how on earth is nothing done about it? And how does the fact that nothing gets done about it seem to be the status quo and keeps occurring year after year, budgetary policy after budgetary policy, operational tour after operational tour? If a magic genie were to appear in front of my eyes, who in keeping with the spirit of the present credit crunch cutbacks, could afford to grant me just one wish, I think I would simply choose a massive increase in helicopters and pilots – a wish that would have such a crucial influence on what is happening to the British Army out here.

We are dealing here with a tenacious and stubborn enemy. Despite our dropping bombs on compounds that the enemy is using as firing-points, the very next day, new enemy fighters are back.

On the one hand, perhaps the enemy command is so feared, authoritative and manipulative that they force unwilling fighters into those compounds as pure cannon fodder. On the other, perhaps, the fighters willingly go back, despite their comrades having been killed there, so strong is their faith in an afterlife, or so strong is their belief in the jihad they are fighting.

Whatever the reason, they come back undaunted to the same firing-points, despite our overwhelming fire power. Their numbers seem to stay constant, as opposed to decreasing – all of which gives a strong indication that we will not be able to reduce their numbers to a level where they are tactically defeated.

It seems increasingly true that a stable Afghanistan will only be possible with some sort of agreement, involvement or power-sharing deal with the Taliban.

However, as the British Army units here are increasingly sucked into the turmoil of the latest "fighting season" there seems little evidence that anything is happening on the political and diplomatic stage. In the meantime, tour follows tour, during which the most intense fighting appears to achieve not much more than extremely effectively inflicting casualties on both sides, whilst Afghanistan remains the sick man of Central Asia.

I think of a scene near the end of Pat Barker's novel The Ghost Road, set at the end of the First World War, in which a seriously injured soldier lies in hospital, gradually dying. The soldier regains consciousness but due to his injuries can only slur a sentence together, which he keeps repeating. His family agonisingly try to decipher what he might be saying, which sounds like "shotvarfet, shotvarfet". His doctor realises what he is trying to say and translates: "He's saying, 'It's not worth it' ."

The man's father, a retired Army major, in grief blurts out: "Oh, it is worth it, it is."

This incredibly powerful passage goes some way to articulating our response to this conflict. We seem to know and say that it is not worth it, whilst instinctively reacting and saying that it is worth it – it has to be worth it. If I am honest, I do not know what I think about it all conclusively; my reasoning is lost in the storm of media, opinions, analysis that are at play here.

However, I know that no matter how hard I try to see through the clutter of opinions and utter something of my own in order to explain or justify what I'm involved in, I just cannot shake off that nagging, repetitive voice in my head that says "shotvarfet, shotvarfet".

The Welsh Guards' casualties

Guardsman Christopher King a 20-year-old from Merseyside was killed in an explosion while on patrol in Helmand on 20 July.

Private John Brackpool was killed by a gunshot wound on 9 July while attached to the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards. The 27-year-old from Sussex was shot near Lashkar Gah.

Lance Corporal Dane Elson was 22 when he was killed by an improvised explosive device during an attack on a compound in Babaji, near Gereshk on 5 July.

Lieutenant Colonel Rupert Thorneloe was a 39 year old from Oxfordshire. He was killed by an IED in Lashkar Gah on 1 July.

Major Sean Birchall a 33-year-old, was killed in an explosion on 19 June while on patrol in Basharan near Lashkar Gah.

Lieutenant Mark Evison, 26-year-old from London, died in hospital in Birmingham on 12 May after being shot in Helmand.

Lance Sergeant Tobie Fasfous was killed by an explosion while on patrol in Helmand on 28 April.

LAT : The CIA, licensed to kill

The CIA, licensed to kill

The agency has been involved in planning assassinations since at least 1954.

By David Wise | July 22, 2009

Back in 1960, the CIA hatched a plan to kill Patrice Lumumba by infecting his toothbrush with a deadly disease. The Congolese leader would brush his teeth and, presto, in a few days or weeks he would be gone.

Around the same time, the CIA's Health Alteration Committee -- who thought that name up? -- sent a monogrammed, poisoned handkerchief to Gen. Abdul Karim Kassem, the leader of Iraq.

And the CIA's "executive action" unit plotted for years to murder Fidel Castro. It hired the Mafia to poison his food and tried to give him a diving suit contaminated with Madura foot, a rare tropical disease that starts in the foot and moves upward, slowly destroying the body. The CIA also considered offing the Cuban leader with an exploding cigar, a poison pen and a seashell that would blow up underwater when he touched it.

Not one of the plots was successful. Lumumba and Kassem were executed by their foes, and Castro is still alive. But the plots make clear that the CIA has been licensed to kill for decades.

Congress -- especially congressional Democrats -- was outraged earlier this month when it was disclosed that, apparently on orders from Vice President Dick Cheney, the CIA for eight years concealed from Congress a program to assassinate the leaders of Al Qaeda, starting with Osama bin Laden. But they shouldn't have been surprised that such a plan was being hatched.

The CIA's involvement in planning assassinations goes back at least to 1954, when it prepared a manual for killings as part of a U.S.-run coup against the leftist government of Guatemala. The 19-page manual, which was declassified in 1997, makes chilling reading. "The essential point of assassination is the death of the subject," it declares, noting that while it "is possible to kill a man with the bare hands ... the simplest local tools are often much the most efficient means of assassination. A hammer, ax, wrench, screwdriver, fire poker, kitchen knife, lamp stand or anything hard, heavy and handy will suffice."

The agency's manual recommends "the contrived accident" as the best way to dispose of someone. "The most efficient accident ... is a fall of 75 feet or more onto a hard surface. Elevator shafts, stairwells, unscreened windows and bridges will serve." The manual suggests grabbing the victim by the ankles and "tipping the subject over the edge. ... Falls before trains or subway cars are usually effective, but require exact timing."

The manual goes on to discuss "blunt weapons," noting that "a hammer can be picked up almost anywhere in the world" and that baseball bats are also excellent. The manual explains the best place in the body to stab people or how to bash their skulls in and the pros and cons of rifles, pistols, submachine guns and other weapons.

During the Cold War years, the CIA plotted against eight foreign leaders, five of whom died violently. The agency's role varied in each case.

After the plots were publicized by a Senate committee, President Ford issued an executive order in 1976 barring political assassination. President Reagan broadened the ban, dropping the word "political" and extending the prohibition to include contract killers as well as government employees.

Although the ban remains in effect, it has largely been ignored on the premise that it does not apply in a military setting. Consider the following:

In 1986, Reagan ordered the bombing of Libya in retaliation for a terrorist attack on a Berlin disco that killed three people, including two U.S. servicemen, and wounded more than 200 others. In the airstrike, Libya's leader, Moammar Kadafi, a target of the raid, escaped unharmed, but his 2-year-old adopted daughter was killed.

During the Persian Gulf War in 1991, when the first Bush administration bombed Baghdad, Robert M. Gates, the former CIA director and current Defense secretary, said White House officials hoped that "Saddam Hussein would be killed in a bunker." At an air base in Saudi Arabia that year, Cheney, then secretary of Defense, and Gen. Colin L. Powell signed a 2,000-pound laser-guided bomb destined for Iraq. "To Saddam with affection," Cheney wrote.

In 1998, President Clinton ordered a cruise missile strike on Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan after the bombing of two U.S. embassies in Africa. The White House was clearly disappointed when the strike failed to kill Bin Laden, who reportedly left one of the camps shortly before the attack.

A year later, again during the Clinton administration, NATO bombed Belgrade after Serbia forced ethnic Albanians to flee from Kosovo. A cruise missile was lobbed right into the bedroom of Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian leader and Yugoslav president, but he was not sleeping there and escaped injury.

In Yemen in 2002, a CIA Predator drone fired a Hellfire missile that destroyed a car in which a top Al Qaeda leader, Qaed Sinan Harithi, was riding.

The problem with assassination, morality aside, is that the U.S. is not very good at it, as the CIA's farcical efforts to murder Castro demonstrate. It seems unlikely that the CIA will kill Bin Laden with a baseball bat. And there is the real possibility of retaliation for a state-sponsored assassination. President Kennedy was quoted as saying, "We can't get into that kind of thing or we would all be targets." Perhaps CIA Director Leon Panetta had that in mind when he canceled the assassination program.

David Wise writes frequently about intelligence. He is the author of "Nightmover: How Aldrich Ames Sold the CIA to the KGB for $4.6 Million" and "Spy: The Inside Story of How the FBI's Robert Hanssen Betrayed America."

Long War Journal : Analysis: Pakistani claims on Baitullah’s death, shura clash, are suspect

Analysis: Pakistani claims on Baitullah’s death, shura clash, are suspect

By Bill Roggio | August 9, 2009

After several senior Taliban leaders went on the record to deny the reports that Baitullah was killed in a US airstrike in South Waziristan, the Pakistani government's claim that Baitullah is dead is now in doubt. Similarly, Pakistani government claims of infighting between potential successors to Baitullah also have to be looked upon with skepticism. Given the Pakistani government's poor track record when claiming senior al Qaeda and Taliban leaders have been killed, the reports of Baitullah's death are now suspect.

Taliban leaders Hakeemullah Mehsud and Qari Hussain Mehsud, spokesman Maulvi Omar, and aide Qari Hidayatullah spoke forcefully today insisting that reports of Baitullah's death were false and said that Baitullah would be issuing proof he was indeed alive.

Despite the Taliban's denial that Baitullah was killed, Rehman Malik, Pakistan's Interior Minister, is insisting Baitullah was killed and upped the ante by claiming two potential successors battled over leadership of the Pakistani Taliban.

Malik, who admitted to the BBC that he has no hard evidence Baitullah was killed, said Hakeemullah Mehsud and Waliur Rehman Mehsud had a shootout at a shura meeting sometime on Friday in the Ladha region in South Waziristan. The meeting was purportedly held to choose a successor to Baitullah. The report was rebroadcast on Pakistani state television. Malik claimed that Hakeemullah and possibly Waliur were killed during the clash.

"Obviously, it is not a story made up by us," Malik told the BBC "This fight must have happened because of the succession."

"They [Hakeemullah and Waliur] had been fighting in the past and we have information that there has been enmity between Waliur and Hakeemullah since they were fighting together in Kurram valley," he said. "Hakeemullah was replaced by Baitullah Mehsud with Waliur."

But a Taliban leader from the Ladha region denied a clash ever took place and claimed to have spoken to Waliur since the incident was said to have taken place.

"There was no fighting in the Shura," a local Taliban commander named Noor Sayed told the media. "Both Waliur Rehman and Hakeemullah are safe and sound."

Hakeemullah confirmed he was alive when he spoke to the media one day after Malik claimed he was killed.

Malik is now insisting the Taliban provide evidence they are alive rather than offering proof that they are dead.

"If Baitullah Mehsud is alive, or Hakeemullah is alive, why don't they bring out a video," Malik said to the BBC. "Every telephone has a camera on it. They can just get one out and show people that they are alive. I challenge them."

Recent history favors the Taliban's account

While it is still unknown if Baitullah survived the strike or perished, the Pakistani government's track record accurately reporting on the death of senior Taliban and al Qaeda leaders is poor [see the list below]. The Taliban, on the other hand, have been honest about the death of their senior leaders. Each time they refuted a claim of a leader being killed, they have been able to prove the commander is alive.

Since 2006, the Pakistani government has inaccurately reported on the death of 10 senior al Qaeda leaders. Some of these leaders were reported killed multiple times, only to resurface. Also during that timeframe, the Pakistani government wrongly claimed eight senior Taliban leader were killed. Again, these reports were disproved.

Most recently, Malik claimed Swat Taliban leader Mullah Fazlullah was killed or seriously wounded during fighting against the Pakistani military. Multiple Taliban leaders denied the claim and Fazlullah later broadcast on his illegal FM radio station in Swat despite the ongoing offensive.

The Pakistani Taliban and al Qaeda have been accurate about the death of their senior leaders, and have issued martyrdom statements or eulogies for those killed. These extremist groups view the death of their leaders and fighters while waging jihad to be an honor, and the deaths are used as propaganda for recruitment. Accurately reporting the status of the senior commanders is also crucial to maintain command and control among the rank and file.

For as long as The Long War Journal has tracked the reports of deaths of senior al Qaeda and Taliban commanders, there is not one single instance where these groups practiced deception when it came to official reports on the death of leaders.

Given these facts, the likelihood is that Baitullah Mehsud survived the strike, as reported first here at The Long War Journal, on Aug. 6. And, if Baitullah survived the strike, there would be no need for the Taliban shura to hold a meeting to select a successor to Baitullah.

It may be possible the Taliban shura was held to discuss other issues, and Hakeemullah and Waliur did indeed clash, but this is also out of character for the Taliban. There is not a single recorded instance of such a shootout or armed clash at a Pakistani Taliban shura meeting.

Contentious meeting have been held between rivals such as Baitullah and Mullah Nazir, and yet these meetings have ended successfully. Also, any meeting to select Baitullah's replacement would likely be attended by senior most Taliban and al Qaeda leaders, such as Siraj Haqqani and Abu Yahya al Libi. Lower level Taliban commanders would place themselves, their families, and tribes at great risk if they endangered the lives the likes of Siraj and Yahya.

The Taliban typically carry out their vendettas via a war of assassins or by armed clashes or raids. One such recent example is the feud between Baitullah and Zainuddin Mehsud. There forces clashed regularly in South Waziristan, Tank, and Dera Ismail Khan. Baitullah ultimately had a bodyguard assassinate Zainuddin.

False reports:

The following al Qaeda and Taliban leaders were reported kill by Pakistani intelligence sources. These leaders later appeared in the media or on propaganda tapes.

Al Qaeda leaders reported killed who later resurfaced:

Ayman al Zawahiri: Several large news outlets reported that al Qaeda's second in command was killed or seriously wounded in the May 14, 2008, airstrike in South Waziristan that killed al Qaeda WMD chief Abu Khabab al Masri. The Long War Journal was highly critical that Zawahiri was killed at the time. Zawahiri appeared on a videotape a week later urging Pakistanis to fight the government.

Mustafa Abu Yazid: The Pakistani military claimed Mustafa Abu Yazid, al Qaeda's senior commander in Afghanistan, was killed in a battle in the Bajaur tribal agency in August 2008. The Long War Journal was highly critical of the reports of Yazid's death. Al Qaeda never confirmed Yazid's death, and the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies never presented evidence he was killed. Yazid has since appeared on multiple videotapes, including the Oct. 4 release that featured Adam Gadahn. The Pakistani military, who refer to Yazid as Abu Saeed al Masri, claimed Yazid was dead as recently as Sept. 26.

Abu Khabab al Masri, Khalid Habib, Abd al Hadi al Iraqi, Abd Rahman al Masri al Maghribi, Abu Obaidah al Masri, and Marwan al Suri

Pakistani intelligence reported that six senior al Qaeda operatives killed in a US airstrike in Damadola in January 2006. The six operatives reported killed were: Abu Khabab al Masri, the WMD committee chief and senior bomb maker; Khalid Habib, a senior military commander in eastern Afghanistan who later became chief of al Qaeda's paramilitary Shadow Army; Abd Rahman al Masri al Maghribi, Zawahiri's son-in-law and a military commander; Abu Obaidah al Masri, al Qaeda's external operations chief and commander in Afghanistan's Kunar province; Marwan al Suri, the Waziristan operations chief; and Abd al Hadi al Iraqi, the external operations chief who also served as a commander in southwestern Afghanistan.

Nineteen month later, The Washington Post reported that all of the al Qaeda commanders survived the strike.

Four of the six later were killed, captured, or died of natural causes. Abd al Hadi al Iraqi was captured while attempting to enter Iraqi in late 2006. Abu Obaidah al Masri died of natural causes sometime in late 2007 or early 2008. Abu Khabab al Masri was killed in an airstrike in July 2008. Khalid Habib was killed in an airstrike in October 2008.

Adam Gadahn: Numerous Pakistani sources told multiple major news outlets that Gadahn was killed in the Jan. 28, 2008, airstrike in North Waziristan that killed senior al Qaeda leader Abu Laith al Libi. The Long War Journal was highly critical of the reports of Gadahn's death. Speculation grew after Gadahn failed to appear on al Qaeda propaganda tapes, As Sahab stopped producing English translations for the tapes, and some problems were reported with the release of videos and audio. Gadahn later appeared on a tape on Oct. 4, along with Yazid. Gadahn is the American al Qaeda spokesman who is wanted by the US for treason.

Rashid Rauf: US intelligence, based on reports from Pakistani intelligence, claimed that Rashid Rauf, an al Qaeda leader who is in charge of al Qaeda's external operations branch responsible for attacks in Europe, was killed during the November 2008 Predator strike in North Waziristan that was also thought to have killed Abu Zubair al Masri and two other al Qaeda operatives. He was later reported to have trained European al Qaeda operatives to conduct attacks in Belgium, France, Holland, and England.

The Long War Journal was skeptical of the claims that Rauf had been killed. US military and intelligence officials have told The Long War Journal that Rauf's death was never confirmed and that reports that he was killed in the November strike in South Waziristan were premature. Shortly after the November strike, Rauf's family and his lawyer claimed his was still alive. Taliban fighters close to Rauf also said he was alive.

Taliban leaders reported killed who later resurfaced:

Baitullah Mehsud: On Sept. 30, 2008, several major news sources reported that Pakistani Taliban leader and South Waziristan warlord Baitullah Mehsud died of natural causes related to kidney problems. The Long War Journal was highly critical that Baitullah was dead, and intelligence sources said he was alive. On Oct. 1, the Taliban denied the report. Baitullah was seen visiting villages in South Waziristan to celebrate Eid-al-Fitr on Oct. 4. Baitullah was also thought to have been killed in an airstrike earlier in 2009.

Mullah Sangeen Zadran: Pakistani intelligence sources claimed that Sangeen, the right hand man of Haqqani Network military commander Siraj, was killed along with Baitullah and Qari Hussain during an airstrike at the funeral of one of Baitullah's commanders. The Taliban quickly debunked these claims.

Faqir Mohammed: The Pakistani military claimed Faqir Mohammed, the deputy commander of the Pakistani Taliban and the group's leader in the Bajaur tribal agency, was killed in a battle in Bajaur in August 2008. A Taliban spokesman immediately denied the report and Faqir appeared in front to the media a day later to dispute the claim of his death. The Pakistani military also claimed Faqir's son, Abdullah Mohammed, was killed, although no proof of his death has been offered.

Mullah Fazlullah: The Pakistani military and the interior ministry claimed Mullah Fazlullah was killed several times during the military operation during the 2009 offensive in Swat. Fazlullah's aides denied the reports, and in July 2009, Fazlullah was later heard giving a speech on the radio.

Omar Khalid: The military said Omar Khalid, the commander of Taliban forces in the Mohmand tribal agency, was killed during operations in the region in January 2009. Taliban commanders denied the claims, and Khalid later spoke to the media.

Ibn Amin: The Pakistani military and the interior ministry claimed Ibn Amin, the leader of al Qaeda's paramilitary brigade in Swat, was killed in May 2009 during the Swat offensive. Amin later resurfaced and took control of the Taliban forces in Swat after Shah Doran, Fazlullah's deputy and Swat's military commander, was killed. Doran is the only senior Swat Taliban leader killed during the three-month battle.

Qari Hussain: The Pakistani military claimed Qari Hussain, a senior lieutenant to Baitullah Mehsud who ran a suicide bomber nursery in South Waziristan, was killed during operations in January 2008. Hussain held a press conference in South Waziristan on May 23, 2008, and mocked the Pakistani military. "I am alive, don't you see me?" Hussain said.

Maulvi Omar: The Pakistani military claimed Omar, who is the spokesman for the Pakistani Taliban, was killed during an October 2008 airstrike in the Badano region in Taliban-controlled Bajaur. Omar later appeared on television. The Long War Journal was skeptical of the reports of Omar's death.

Brilliant : Obama’s Pakistan Campaign

brilliant media: Un blog utilisant Le Blogue du Québec

Winter Patriot: Obama’s Pakistan Campaign: Brilliant President Plus Smart Bombs Equal Humanitarian Success

I note with proud stupefaction a modern article from Dubai’s Gulfnews place com, describing the non-stop striving of bombing attacks during unmanned planes against Pakistan (which the American lead and media resolve not mostly talk impenetrable to — officially — but which are largely arranged to be undertaken during the CIA at the aiming of the president). Unofficial lead sources beget been weighing in lately, all unequivocally in favor of continuing the attacks. For in the event, a July 14 commandant in the Wall Street Journal says that Far from being “beyond the right side up,” drones beget made war-fighting more humane. as a lead This aspect of aspect may look as if a share in extraordinary, genuineness that the “success” claimed on behalf of the drones has been degree acned. In bumf, according to Pakistani lead sources, as of April 8 of this year, US attacks on Pakistan had killed 14 al Q’aeda terrorists and 687 civilians. Rashid Rauf was reportedly killed in a drone attack in November of 2008, but his assembly has not lower than drunk any condition been produced and his family’s bring to light due to the fact that the consideration of his remains was ignored during the Pakistani government; Rauf’s forebears and his attorney bring to light he may be ready to drop crazy, but they velitation the call due to the fact that that he was killed then and in that conduct.

The star correlation — with simulated terrorists accounting due to the fact that approximately one-fiftieth of the people killed — may beget been measure over-estimated in this lead relate, since individual of the “high-value targets” allegedly killed in these attacks (and included focus of the 14) is Rashid Rauf, the simulated commandant of (or at least an simulated latchkey commandant in) the theoretically iffy transatlantic-airline liquid-bombing patch (which I beget discussed at capacious expanse fully in the gone: due to the fact that a mechanical overview of the patch, make up one’s mind “Ludicrouser And Ludicrouser: The Alleged Liquid Bombing Plot, Revisited Again”; due to the fact that an stimulus of what this means, make up one’s mind “Inadequate Deception: The Impossible Plots Of The Terror War”). You don’t beget to be a lunatic moonbat Gothick novel philosopher or a Pakistani terrorist-sympathizer to call due to the fact that that Rashid Rauf perhaps wasn’t killed in a drone attack. Long War Journal hotel-keeper Bill Roggio, who mostly gets basically bumf course of action back the marginally-less-complicit-but-still-criminal mainstream gathering, declared with no holds barred in April that Rashid Rauf is calm spry and iffy and plotting against us all. If that’s true-blue, then the numbers would be more like: 13 bomber leaders ready to drop crazy, and 688 untainted people.

As Bill Roggio wrote exactly a two days ago, Reports of older al Qaeda and Taliban leaders killed in Pakistan beget been praisefully untrustworthy. And that’s giving the earnest statistician the aid of every distrust. In the gone, al Qaeda leaders Ayman al Zawahiri, Abd al Hadi al Iraqi, Abu Obaidullah Al Masri, Adam Gadahn, Ibn Amin, and Rashid Rauf beget been reported killed in strikes, but these men later resurfaced.

Similarly, Sa’ad bin Laden was recently reported killed, but he is every now remembrances to be spry. And Abu Khabab al Masri was reported ready to drop crazy a few times course of action back he surely was killed in a July 2008 whack. But that’s a sandbank assessment, because after a insecure start we did start doing a best allot, as you as a lead can make up one’s mind when I hang on to the statistics down chronologically. as a lead Given all the billions we assign on intelligence aggregation, and all the billions we assign on developing adept weapons, you puissance think about we should be doing a best allot of death terrorists and stingy innocents. According to the relate from Pakistan which I mentioned heavens, Two strikes carried crazy in 2006 had killed 98 civilians while three attacks conducted in 2007 had slain 66 Pakistanis due to the fact that a thorough of 164 civilian deaths — and no terrorists were focus of the ready to drop crazy in either 2006 or 2007!By distinguish, according to the done relate, 385 people gone their lives in 2008 and 152 people were slain in the basic 99 days of 2009 (between January 1 and April 8) due to the fact that a thorough of 537 untainted civilians killed, along with the “14 wanted al-Qaeda operatives”. It may not look as if like much, but insomuch as the inauguration configuration of this striving, these reports merrymaking a double-dose of star. The thorough of “wanted al-Qaeda operatives” allegedly killed has ballooned from 0 in 2006-7 all the course of action to 14 in 2008-9, and at the done shilly-shally the thorough of innocents killed per bomber has dropped from 164:0 (an innumerable ratio) to on the other hand 38 — provided of unmistakably that Rashid Rauf and all the other terrorists described as ready to drop crazy are surely ready to drop crazy, and were surely terrorists.

As we distinguish, anything is admissible due to the fact that can-do Americans, and as the newest relate from Dubai indicates, we beget enhanced our exhibit significantly since the Pakistani relate was compiled in April. Some people may beget felt these improvements were edible masses, but audibly Barack Obama was not focus of them. Here’s the most terrific have the je sais quoi of: According to Gulfnews, the thorough of Pakistani civilians killed since the inception of 2008 is every now on the other hand 480! That’s down during 57 since the thorough was 537 in April!So think about impenetrable to this: In the at four months, we beget continued bombing Pakistan, death (or at least claiming to beget killed) more and more “high-value targets”, such as Osama bin Laden’s son Sa’ad (who may not beget had anything to do with terrorism at all, other than being sired during an private CIA operative), and Baitullah Mehsud (who has apropos been the CIA’s most intense weapon in South Asia by any chance since Osama bin Laden died in 2001).

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WaPo : Congress and the CIA: Time to Move On

Congress and the CIA: Time to Move On

By Leon Panetta | August 2, 2009

Last month, at a meeting overseas of intelligence service chiefs, one of my counterparts from a major Western ally pulled me aside. Why, he asked, is Washington so consumed with what the CIA did in the past, when the most pressing national security concerns are in the present? It was a very good question. In fact, I've become increasingly concerned that the focus on the past, especially in Congress, threatens to distract the CIA from its crucial core missions: intelligence collection, analysis and covert action.

In our democracy, effective congressional oversight of intelligence is important, but it depends as much on consensus as it does on secrecy. We need broad agreement between the executive and legislative branches on what our intelligence organizations do and why. For much of our history, we have had that. Over the past eight years, on specific issues -- including the detention and interrogation of terrorists -- the consensus deteriorated. That contributed to an atmosphere of declining trust, growing frustration and more frequent leaks of properly classified information.

In its earliest days, the Obama administration made policy changes in intelligence that ended some controversial practices. The CIA no longer operates black sites and no longer employs "enhanced" interrogation techniques. It is worth remembering that the CIA implements presidential decisions; we do not make them. Yet my agency continues to pay a price for enduring disputes over policies that no longer exist. Those conflicts fuel a climate of suspicion and partisanship on Capitol Hill that our intelligence officers -- and our country -- would be better off without. My goal as director is to do everything I can to build the kind of dialogue and trust with Congress that is essential to our intelligence mission.
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In that spirit, on June 24, I briefed the intelligence oversight committees of Congress on a highly classified program that had been brought to my attention the day before. Never fully operational, the program had not, in seven years, taken a single terrorist off the street, and information about it had not been shared appropriately with Congress. For me, this was more than just a simple question of law or legal requirements. Rather, it was a reflection of my firm belief that a straightforward and honest partnership with Congress can build support for intelligence. That's what I want, and I am convinced it's what our nation needs.

Unfortunately, rather than providing an opportunity to start a new chapter in CIA-congressional relations, the meeting sparked a fresh round of recriminations about the past. I recognize that there will always be tension in oversight relationships, but there are also shared responsibilities. Those include protecting the classified information that shapes our conversations. Together, the CIA and Congress must find a balance between appropriate oversight and a recognition that the security of the United States depends on a CIA that is totally focused on the job of defending America.

The time has come for both Democrats and Republicans to take a deep breath and recognize the reality of what happened after Sept. 11, 2001. The question is not the sincerity or the patriotism of those who were dealing with the aftermath of Sept. 11. The country was frightened, and political leaders were trying to respond as best they could. Judgments were made. Some of them were wrong. But that should not taint those public servants who did their duty pursuant to the legal guidance provided. The last election made clear that the public wanted to move in a new direction.

Intelligence can be a valuable weapon, but it is not one we should use on each other. As the president has said, this is not a time for retribution. Debates over who knew what when -- or what happened seven years ago -- miss a larger, more important point: We are a nation at war in a dangerous world, and good intelligence is vital to us all. That is where our focus should be. The CIA has plenty of tools to fight al-Qaeda and its allies. Unlike the effort I canceled in June, our present tools are effective, we use them aggressively to go after our enemies, and Congress has been briefed on them.

When President Obama visited the CIA in April, he told agency officers, "I am going to need you more than ever." The men and women of the CIA truly are America's first line of defense. They must run risks and make sacrifices to acquire the intelligence our country needs for its safety and security. Having spent 16 years in the House, I know that Congress can get the facts it needs to do its job without undue strife or name-calling. I also know that we can learn lessons from the past without getting stuck there. That is what the American people expect. The CIA is ready to do its part. The nation deserves no less.

The writer is director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

South Coast Today : Military says linguists can't keep up in Afghanistan

Military says linguists can't keep up in Afghanistan

By JASON STRAZIUSO | Associated Press writer | July 26, 2009

NAWA, Afghanistan — Josh Habib lay in a dirt field, gasping for air. Two days of hiking with Marines through southern Afghanistan's 115-degree heat had exhausted him. This was not what he signed up for.

Habib is not a Marine. He is a 53-year-old engineer from California who was hired by a contracting company as a military translator. When he applied for the lucrative linguist job, Habib said his recruiter gave no hint that he would join a ground assault in Taliban land. He carried 40 pounds of food, water and gear on his back, and kept pace — barely — with Marines half his age.

U.S. troops say companies that recruit military translators are sending linguists to southern Afghanistan who are unprepared to serve in combat, even as hundreds more are needed to support the growing number of troops.

Some translators are in their 60s and 70s and in poor physical condition, and some don't even speak the right language.

"I've met guys off the planes and have immediately sent them back because they weren't in the proper physical shape," said Gunnery Sgt. James Spangler, who is in charge of linguists at Camp Leatherneck, the largest U.S. base in Helmand province.

"They were too old. They couldn't breathe. They complained about heart problems," he said. "We almost made a joke of it. We're almost receiving people on oxygen tanks and colostomy bags; it's almost getting to that point."

And that is not the worst of it.

Troops say low-skilled and disgruntled translators are putting U.S. forces at risk.

"Intelligence can save Marines' lives and give us the advantage on the battlefield," said Cpl. William Woodall, 26, of Dallas, who works closely with translators. "Instead of looking for quality, the companies are just pushing bodies out here, and once they're out the door, it's not their problem anymore."

Spangler, 36, of Lecanto, Fla., emphasized that translators must be physically fit.

"When we have convoys that are out days or weeks at a time and you have someone that's 60 or 70 years old, I have to put the directive in: I need someone younger, can get out of a vehicle quickly, can run for short periods if needed, anything that's required for combat operations with Marines," Spangler said.

The company that recruits most U.S. citizen translators, Columbus, Ohio-based Mission Essential Personnel, says it is difficult to meet the increased demand for linguists to aid the 15,000 U.S. forces being sent to southern, Pashto-speaking provinces this year as part of President Barack Obama's increased focus on Afghanistan. Only 7,700 Pashto speakers live in the U.S., according to the 2000 census.

Mission Essential Senior Vice President Marc Peltier told The Associated Press that the linguists the company deploys to Afghanistan, Iraq and other countries meet government standards. The military sets no age or weight requirements.

"I really wish everyone we send over was a 21-year-old who can pass the Marine Corps physical fitness exam. They're not," he said.

"It's been a shock to some of them. You can't really acclimate them. We don't have centers to run scenarios out in the heat. It is a surprise to many of them and it's very, very hard work, especially with a lot of the new Marines that are going into Helmand province," he said.

How translators come to believe they will not face danger could originate with recruiters.

"They're going to tell you whatever it is to get you hired," Spangler said.

Khalid Nazary, an Afghan-American citizen living in Kabul, called Mission Essential about a job and let an AP reporter listen.

He asked whether he would go to "dangerous places."

"Oh, no, no, no. You're not a soldier. You're not a soldier. Not at all," said the recruiter, Tekelia Barnett. "You're not on the battlefield."

The Afghan-American asked repeatedly whether he would be sent on battlefield missions. Barnett said he would translate for soldiers at schools, mosques or hospitals. After being pressed on the point, Barnett said the linguist would be subject to "any" assignment, and if he did not want the task he could quit.

Peltier later told AP it was indeed possible that translators would be on the battlefield. He said he would talk to Barnett to make sure she made that more clear. Peltier also said the first phone call was "introductory" and that recruits go through two weeks of training "and get a very clear picture of what they're going to do."

Others disagreed.

"They say you'll get a shower once a day, have access to Internet and TV, call home six times a week," Woodall said. "And when the guys get out, they're completely shell-shocked. They've been lied to."

Habib, the translator who spoke to the AP while carrying a heavy pack in the stifling heat, said a Mission Essential recruiter originally told him that if he passed his language test, he would work out of the main U.S. base at Bagram about 30 miles north of the Afghan capital, Kabul.

"That's what she promised me over the phone. That was attractive to me, and it was safe," Habib said.

Once in Afghanistan, he says he was told he would lose his job if he didn't go with the Marines to Helmand.

"It's been very hard, very hard, physically," said Habib, a Pashto-speaking U.S. citizen born in Pakistan who says he signed up because he wanted to serve his country.

Troops and translators say they suspect recruiting companies try to send as many interpreters as possible to Afghanistan to collect fees.

Millions of dollars are involved. Known as Category II translators — U.S. citizens who obtain a security clearance — such linguists earn a salary that starts at $210,000 a year.

Mission Essential Personnel recruits and hires most Category II linguists in Afghanistan. Peltier said the company was founded by two former Army Special Forces reservists who sought to improve the quality of translators after seeing them "pushed out the door and being mistreated."

The military gave Mission Essential performance bonuses in each quarter last year, Peltier said. When the company took over the Afghanistan language contract in late 2007, only

41 percent of linguists' jobs were filled. Today 97 percent of the jobs are taken, he said.

At Camp Leatherneck, four U.S.-citizen interpreters spoke with AP but none gave his name for fear of losing his job.

The translators said dozens of linguists quit soon after arriving in Afghanistan in recent weeks. Spangler declined to provide numbers but said "quite a bit" resigned or were fired because they were too old, unfit or couldn't speak Pashto.

Army Sgt. Will Gamez, 26, of Los Angeles, said he recently worked with a linguist who spoke only the Afghan language of Dari, instead of Pashto.

One translator alleged that most of his colleagues cannot speak Pashto, and that some recruits in the U.S. were bypassing the language test administered for Mission Essential by having a skilled Pashto speaker take it over the phone. The company does not require the initial test be taken in person but later gives in-person tests.

Spangler said the military is working its way through dozens of newly arrived interpreters and that the system will weed out the weaker ones by September.

But Gamez said soldiers need translators now, and that some feign sickness to avoid work.

"If he doesn't go out, I can't do my job," Gamez said. "If locals come up to us, we can't tell what they're saying. They might be warning us about a minefield. They might be warning us about an ambush."

CNN : Recruits reveal al Qaeda's sprawling web

Recruits reveal al Qaeda's sprawling web

* Interviews with accused al Qaeda members reveal how it is adapting
* Accounts show it's suffering from U.S. attacks; possible funding problems
* Now running smaller operations along Pakistan border, still planning major attacks

By CNN Senior International Correspondent Nic Robertson and Paul Cruickshank | July 31, 2009

Editor's note: This story is based on interrogation reports that form part of the prosecution case in the forthcoming trial of six Belgian citizens charged with participation in a terrorist group. Versions of those documents were obtained by CNN from the defense attorney of one of those suspects. The statement by Bryant Vinas was compiled from an interview he gave Belgian prosecutors in March 2009 in New York, and was confirmed by U.S. prosecutors as authentic. The statement by Walid Othmani was given to French investigators, and was authenticated by Belgian prosecutors.

(CNN) -- When Bryant Neal Vinas spoke at length with Belgian prosecutors last March, he provided a fascinating and sometimes frightening insight into al Qaeda's training -- and its agenda.

Vinas is a young American who was arrested in Pakistan late in 2008 after allegedly training with al Qaeda in the Afghan/Pakistan border area.

He was repatriated to the United States and in January pled guilty to charges of conspiracy to murder U.S. nationals, providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization, and receiving military-type training from a foreign terrorist organization.

In notes made by FBI agents of interviews with Vinas, he admits he went to Pakistan to join al Qaeda and kill U.S. troops in Afghanistan. But the terror group appeared to have other ideas for him. He volunteered to become a suicide bomber but was dissuaded at every turn. On Thanksgiving weekend last year, shortly after his arrest, much of the New York mass transit system was put on high alert, including Penn Station. According to the Belgian prosecutor's document, Vinas had told al Qaeda's command everything he knew about the system.

Vinas's account of his time in al Qaeda training camps in Pakistan is a playbook of how the terror group survived after 9/11 and continues to operate in the remote hills of Pakistan.

Al Qaeda has shown remarkable adaptability and remains as committed as ever to launching attacks in the West, according to the descriptions of several alleged Western recruits, including Vinas, who spent time together in al Qaeda camps in the region between September 2007 and December 2008.

In their interrogations, the recruits revealed al Qaeda's continued determination to attack mass transport systems in the West and training programs for new forms of attack, including breaking into residences to carry out targeted assassinations.

The documents provide an inside view of al Qaeda's organizational structures, training programs, and the protective measures the terrorist organization has taken against increasingly effective U.S. missile strikes.

And they arguably shed more light on the state of al Qaeda than any previously released into the public domain.

Intelligence officials say intensified U.S. Predator drone strikes have degraded al Qaeda's capabilities since the end of last year, but the accounts suggest that because of the decentralization of its organization and close ties with the Pakistani Taliban, the terrorist network will be difficult to dislodge from Pakistan's tribal areas.

Despite not being able to operate training camps on anything like the scale they did in Afghanistan, the accounts suggest that al Qaeda has been able to sustain many of its training operations by confining them to small dwellings in the remote mountains of Waziristan. Inside these dwellings bomb-making training appears to have been emphasized, some of it very sophisticated.

An American joins al Qaeda

On September 10, 2007, almost exactly six years after al Qaeda attacked New York, Vinas, a 24-year-old Queens-born American citizen boarded a flight from the city en route to Lahore, in eastern Pakistan, determined to fight jihad in neighboring Afghanistan.

Brought up a Catholic by his Latin American immigrant parents, who divorced when he was young, Vinas tried to join the U.S. army in 2002 but dropped out after just a few weeks.

In 2004 -- for reasons which are still unclear -- he converted to Islam and started frequenting a mosque in Long Island near where he lived with his father. Over the next three years he became radicalized, U.S. officials have stated, in no small part because of his exposure to pro-al Qaeda Web sites.

A former U.S. government official told CNN that youths influenced by the ideas of the British pro-al Qaeda extremist group Al Muhajiroun were known to have hung out in the vicinity of the mosque at the same time as Vinas.

The former official told CNN that they were a splinter group of the Al Muhajiroun followers who used to hang out in the New York/Long Island area in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

Al Muhajiroun's American members, the former official stated, included Syed Hashmi, a Brooklyn college graduate who traveled to Pakistan in 2003 and now awaits trial on charges of providing material support to the terrorist network. He has pled not guilty.

Another who belonged to Al Muhajiroun was Mohammed Junaid Babar, a trainee Queens taxi driver, who met two of the July 7, 2005 London bombers in Pakistan and who in 2004 pled guilty to providing material support to terrorists in Pakistan. Al Muhajiroun was formally disbanded in October 2004 but still operates, CNN has discovered, under a variety of guises.

Anjem Choudhary, the former deputy leader of Al Muhajiroun, told CNN Monday that New York was one of the organization's main hubs before 2004. He says dozens of followers from the New York area still regularly tune into online sermons put together by the group's founder Omar Bakri Mohammed in Tripoli, Lebanon, where he has been living since being banned from the UK after the 2005 London bombings.

Choudhary stated that he and Bakri were still loosely affiliated with The Islamic Thinkers Society, a New York based organization, which says the peaceful restoration of the Islamic Caliphate is one of its objectives.

A March 5, 2009 posting on the homepage of its Web site states that Bakri Mohammed is "a man who has inspired thousands across the world to rise for Islam." The Islamic Thinkers Society exists legally in the United States and says it is committed solely to the political and intellectual struggle for Islam.

When Vinas arrived in Lahore he had little idea about how he was going to gain access to the fighting in Afghanistan, according to his own account. But a few days after he arrived he sought help from a New York friend whom he knew moved in militant circles.

One introduction led to another and eventually Vinas met a Jihadist commander about to return to Afghanistan. Identified in legal documents as S.S., their commander agreed to let him join his group. CNN has learned from a source briefed on the case that the initials S.S. stand for a man who goes by the name of Shah Saab, and is believed to be somewhere in Pakistan's tribal areas.

At the end of September Vinas was whisked in the commander's car into Pakistan's tribal areas and then across the border into Afghanistan to join up with a small band of fighters targeting an American base. The raid however was called off at the last minute because of American aircraft circling above.

His quick introduction to the fighting appears to have been unusual. Vinas stated it was standard for fighters to undergo military training before being selected for such missions.

It is possible he persuaded his handlers that his brief stint as a U.S. army recruit justified him being fast-tracked; or perhaps the jihadist group just needed more fighters.

On his return to Mohmand, a district in Pakistan's tribal areas, Vinas was asked by one of the fighters if he wanted to become a suicide bomber. Vinas, according to his own account, accepted and was sent to Peshawar, Pakistan, for more instruction.

But his handlers there judged that he had not received enough religious instruction to launch such an attack. Perhaps it was dawning on them just how valuable an American recruit might one day be.

Vinas stated that at this point he traveled back to a village in Waziristan where he spent time with a number of al Qaeda members, including a number of Saudis and Yemenis.

In March 2008 he successfully persuaded one of them, a Yemeni he identified as Soufran, to recommend him for formal membership in the terrorist group. Only Soufran's initials appeared in the legal document but CNN obtained his name from a source briefed on the case. His current whereabouts are unknown.

According to Vinas, al Qaeda recruits were asked to fill out forms with personal information and hand over their passports when they joined the organization, but were not required to sign a contract or take part in a ceremony to become a member of al Qaeda.

The Belgian-French group

Around this time, Vinas says in his interrogation, he came across several Belgian and French militants who had traveled to Pakistan's tribal areas at the beginning of the year, also intent on fighting in Afghanistan.

The group's members -- four Belgians and two French citizens, all of North African descent -- were recruited, Belgian police say, by Malika el Aroud and Moez Garsallaoui, a married couple who had long enjoyed a notorious reputation among European counter-terrorism services.

El Aroud's previous husband, Abdessattar Dahmane, had assassinated Ahmed Shah Massoud, the head of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, in a suicide bombing attack ordered by Osama bin Laden two days before 9/11.

When CNN interviewed the couple in 2006, El Aroud showed how she administered a pro-al Qaeda Web forum called Minbar SOS, which included pro-al Qaeda postings and propaganda videos.

Belgian investigators say the Web site played an important role in the radicalization of members of the French-Belgian group.

One of them was a 25-year-old Frenchman, Walid Othmani. He was arrested on his return to France from Pakistan. Belgian prosecutors told CNN Othmani has been charged in France with participation in a criminal conspiracy with the aim of preparing a terrorist act.

"I don't think I would have left to fight Jihad without viewing these videos [on Minbar] ... it made me aware that the European media were hiding things about the situation in Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan," Othmani told French interrogators, according to Belgian legal documents obtained by CNN.

According to Belgian counter-terrorism officials, Garsallaoui, a Tunisian citizen, recruited some of those who traveled to Pakistan in person in Brussels, but relied on the Internet to recruit others.

The six recruits met Garsallaoui in Istanbul in December 2007. With Garsallaoui setting off first, they followed him towards Pakistan, paying off a series of people-smugglers between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, to gain entry to al Qaeda's heartlands in the mountains of Waziristan.

Vinas says he met with at least three members of this group in Waziristan: its leader Moez Garsallaoui, Hamza el Alami, and Hicham Bouhali Zrioul, a Belgian-Moroccan who once worked as a taxi driver in Brussels. All three are believed by Belgian intelligence officials to be at large in the mountainous area along the Pakistan/Afghan border.

Three other members -- Hicham Beyayo, Ali El Ghanouti and Said Harrizi -- were arrested when they returned to Belgium and have been charged with participation in a terrorist group. They don't dispute they went to fight Jihad; they do deny participating in a terrorist group.

Al Qaeda's new training facilities

Between March and July 2008 Vinas stated that he attended three al Qaeda training courses, which focused on weapons, explosives, and rocket-based or propelled weaponry.

During these classes, attended by 10-20 recruits, Vinas was taught how to handle a large variety of weapons and explosives, some of them of military grade sophistication, according to his account.

Vinas stated he became familiar with seeing, smelling and touching different explosives such as TNT, as well as plastic explosives such as RDX, and Semtex, C3 and C4 -- the explosive U.S. authorities have stated was used in al Qaeda's attack on the USS Cole in 2000. Vinas also learned how to make vests for suicide bombers.

Vinas stated that he was also instructed how to prepare and place fuses, how to test batteries, how to use voltmeters and how to build circuitry for a bomb. According to his account, al Qaeda also offered a wide variety of other courses including electronics, sniper, and poisons training.

Instruction in the actual construction of bombs, he stated, was offered to al Qaeda recruits who had become more advanced in their training.

Vinas' training during this period was very similar to the training described by members of the French-Belgian group. Othmani, the French recruit, stated that the group were given explosives training and taught how to fire rocket launchers and RPGs.

Like Vinas, the group had been required to sign forms before their training. Othmani stated that his group was required to pledge absolute obedience to their handlers and indicate whether they wanted to become suicide bombers.

Othmani provided interesting new details about the training facilities being used by al Qaeda in the tribal areas.

His group trained in a small mountain shack, a far cry from the large camps al Qaeda had run in Taliban-era Afghanistan, when it had been able to operate with little danger of being targeted by military strikes.

However the wide number of training courses described by both Vinas and Othmani suggest that al Qaeda has been able to adapt well to the new security environment. By operating a larger number of smaller facilities, al Qaeda would also appear to have increased its resilience to attack.

While the classrooms are safer from drone attacks than the pre-9/11 sessions on the mountainsides the content seems to have changed to match new targeting plans.

Suicide vest and IED construction show how the curriculum is being modified for today's combat with U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Making and handling explosives, as well as fuse construction, show the sessions may also be geared for killing in Europe and the United States.

These are the very skills the July 7, 2005 London bombers Shehzad Tanweer and Mohammed Siddique came to Pakistan to learn. Al Qaeda, it would seem, may still want to pull off spectacular attacks in Europe or the United States.

Vinas says he took a course in propelled weaponry with Zrioul, the former Brussels taxi driver, whom he first met in March 2008, and formed a friendship with.

Vinas stated that when they completed their training, al Qaeda instructors did a written evaluation of their performance. Vinas had been judged qualified to participate in missile attacks against U.S. and NATO bases in Afghanistan, according to his account.

That suggests al Qaeda has maintained its capacity for administration and paperwork even in a harsher security environment.

When their training finished in the summer of 2008, Vinas and Zrioul lived in the same house in the mountains of Waziristan. Zrioul managed to acquire a computer which he rigged up to watch Jihadist videos.

According to Othmani, al Qaeda fighters numbered between 300-500 in Pakistan's Tribal Areas -- spread out in groups of 10. Such decentralization was a function of the growing deadliness of U.S. military strikes using Predator drones.

Hicham Beyayo, one of the Belgian Jihadist volunteers, said his group moved around a lot because such strikes were known to be "very effective," his lawyer, Christophe Marchand told CNN.

The loss of an increasing number of operatives, stated Othmani, prompted an order from al Qaeda's top command for fighters to remain inside as much as possible. In order to keep in touch jihadists operated a courier service across the region according to the Frenchman's testimony.

The decentralization of al Qaeda's structures appear to have created some costs for recruits.

Two members of the Belgian-French group describe feeling increasingly cut off, bored, and fed up with the primitive living conditions in their mountain shacks.

They often did not seem to know what their next orders would be or where their handlers would take them. They also described being deeply frustrated at being repeatedly given false promises that they would be able to fight in Afghanistan.

Othmani also described the group's frustration at having to pay for their own weapons and training -- at a cost of €1,300 (about $1,800) -- which if true might lend credence to reports that al Qaeda has come under financial strain. Vinas, for his part, made no mention of having to make payments to his handlers.

New attack plans

During a mountain walk with Zrioul one day, Vinas says he was told about a new course being taught by al Qaeda called "international operations" set up by the organization's head of international operations whom Vinas later identified as Abu Hafith.

Hafith, he stated, was responsible for recruitment and direction of terrorist cells, and attacks outside Pakistan and Afghanistan. Hafith was identified by his initials in the legal document but CNN obtained his name from a source briefed on the case. He is believed to be still at large in the Pakistan-Afghan border area.

Vinas was told that the training course Hafith set up focused on kidnapping and assassination, including instruction on the use of silencers and how to break into and enter a property.

The revelations raise the possibility that al Qaeda was developing a program of targeted assassinations. Though al Qaeda has carried out some assassinations in the past, most of its attacks in the West have not targeted any particular individuals but crowded areas, such as mass transport.

Vinas stated that Zrioul also discussed with him an attack on the Brussels metro, telling him it was a soft target because it was poorly protected. He said Zrioul also raised the possibility of launching an attack on a European football stadium.

A senior Belgian intelligence official told CNN that Belgian security services only learned about these conversations in March 2009 after Vinas met with Belgian prosecutors in New York. Although concerned, Belgium's intelligence service concluded that no concrete plot had likely existed, said the official.

Such conversations illustrate the terror network's continued desire to inflict mass casualties. Vinas stated that he himself gave detailed briefings to al Qaeda chiefs in Waziristan in September 2008 about how the Long Island Commuter Rail service worked, according to a federal indictment earlier this month.

Vinas' life as an al Qaeda fighter saw him rotate between fighting behind enemy lines in Afghanistan, training in remote mountain dwellings in the tribal areas, and spending downtime in Peshawar, the capital of Pakistan's North West Frontier Province, movements which indicate that al Qaeda has recently found it possible to operate in a large swath of territory across Pakistan's North-west.

Vinas not only had a toe amputated in Peshawar, but also went there to look for a wife. None of this would have happened without al Qaeda's blessing. Although he was ultimately arrested in Peshawar, al Qaeda would not have signed off on his visits unless they'd felt confident he'd be safe there.

Meetings with top al Qaeda leaders

During his travels Vinas met some of al Qaeda's top leaders, leaders he was able to identify to U.S. authorities after his capture. According to U.S. investigators, quoted by the Los Angeles Times, Vinas says he met with Abu Yayha al Libi, one of al Qaeda's principal spokesmen and Rashid Rauf, the British al Qaeda operative suspected of coordinating a plot against transatlantic aviation in August 2006. Rauf, who was arrested that August in Pakistan, escaped from custody in December 2007 but is believed to have been killed in a Predator strike in North Waziristan in November 2008.

Vinas says he also met with an individual by the name of Abdullah Saeed, whom he says replaced Abu Leith al Libbi as al Qaeda's military chief in Afghanistan and Pakistan in January 2008. A former jihadist told CNN that Saeed is almost certainly Mustafa Abu Al-Yazid, an Egyptian also known as Sheikh Saeed. In June Al-Yazid released an audio recording complaining of a lack of funds for the fighting in Afghanistan.

Raids into Afghanistan

Vinas stated that he met with Saeed in the late summer of 2008 in Waziristan, and al Qaeda's military chief personally instructed him to join a group of fighters targeting American bases from the tribal areas of Pakistan. This January, Vinas pleaded guilty to having targeted an American base in September 2008.

That attack however appears to have been a failure. Creeping up towards the American forward operating base Vinas and other al Qaeda fighters' first attempt to fire on the base was botched by radio problems. The second rocket attack fell short of the base, according to Vinas' account.

Attacks by his associates however may have been more deadly. In June 2008 Moez Garsallaoui, the French-Belgian group leader, wrote an email to his wife in Belgium, intercepted by U.S. counter-terrorism agencies, in which he claimed to have killed several Americans in Afghanistan, according to Belgian legal documents.

And Walid Othmani said that in July 2008 Garsallaoui told him he had killed Americans by firing rockets at an American combat outpost from Pakistan, according to the documents. As he was not specific about the date, CNN has not been able to substantiate the claim.

Both Vinas and Othmani described close ties between al Qaeda and Taliban elements in the tribal areas of Pakistan.

The relationship between the two groups was so close, Vinas stated, that members of al Qaeda were also sometimes simultaneously members of the Taliban.

Garsallaoui appears to be one such recruit. In a message he posted on Minbar SOS on May 11, 2009, discovered by CNN, he described undertaking raids with "brother Taliban" from the tribal areas of Pakistan against targets in Afghanistan. "Nothing has given me greater pleasure than encountering [American] soldiers during long days on the battlefield," he said.

A continued threat to the West.

Between late July and early December of 2008 four members of the Belgian-French group -- Beyayo, El Ghanouti, Harrizi and Othmani -- returned to Europe.

On December 11 Belgian counter-terrorism police launched one of the largest operations in the country's history, arresting six people including Garsallaoui's wife Malika el Aroud and charging them with participation in a terrorist group.

According to Belgian counter-terrorism sources, the trigger for the Brussels arrests was an intercepted e-mail sent by one of the alleged recruits, Beyayo, in early December shortly after he returned to Belgium.

The e-mail allegedly suggested Beyayo had been given the green light to launch an attack in Belgium.

However no explosives were recovered by Belgian police, and some terrorism analysts are skeptical that an attack was imminent.

Beyayo's lawyer, Christophe Marchand, told CNN in February that the e-mail was merely "tough talk" to impress an ex-girlfriend. Belgian authorities continue to insist that the alleged cell was a potential national security threat.

Vinas, for his part, was arrested by Pakistani police in Peshawar in November 2008 and transferred into American custody.

Of those still thought to be at large, Garsallaoui issued this threat to Belgium authorities on his wife's Web site on May 11, 2009: "If you thought that you could pressure me to slow down through the arrest of my wife, you were wrong. It won't stop me fulfilling my objectives... the place of my wife in my heart and the heart of all the mujahedeen is greater than ever... Surprises are sure to be in store for you in the days ahead. Those who laugh last, laugh more."

Such threats will have caused concern because of Garsallaoui's wide connections in European militant circles. Two of his Brussels associates, Bassam Ayachi, 62, and Raphael Gendron 33, are in custody in Italy, charged with being leaders of a logistical support team for al Qaeda. They have denied the charges.

The duo, who were detained in the port city of Bari in November for trying to illegally smuggle Middle Easterners into the country, had allegedly talked to each other in their detention center about what sounded like a scheme to attack Charles de Gaulle airport in Paris, a conversation bugged by Italian police. French officials have said they were never aware of a concrete plot to attack the airport.

According to a senior Belgian intelligence official, Garsallaoui, his wife El Aroud, and several others who traveled to Pakistan were all connected through the Centre Islamique Belge, an organization Belgian authorities say espouses hardline Salafist and pro-al Qaeda views.

In past interviews the organization's founder Bassam Ayachi has said it concentrates on pastoral care for Muslims in Brussels and did not promote pro-al Qaeda views.

Members of the Brussels-based group are believed to have received terrorist training in other countries besides Pakistan.

In late May, several days before U.S. President Barack Obama traveled to Cairo to give a major speech, several Belgian citizens were arrested in Egypt and accused of being members of a terrorist cell affiliated with al Qaeda.

A senior Belgian counter-terrorism official told CNN that two Belgians now in Egyptian custody were known associates of Garsallaoui at the Centre Islamique Belge and are believed to have received military training with an ultra-extremist Palestinian group in Gaza.

"Anybody who gets such training is obviously a potential danger if they return to Europe," said the official.

The insider accounts of al Qaeda operations in the tribal areas of Pakistan make clear the terrorist organization's continued determination to attack the West.

While the potential pool of recruits may have shrunk significantly because of a backlash against al Qaeda in Muslim communities around the world -- due to its targeting of civilians and the fact that so many of its victims have been Muslim -- the insider accounts suggest that there are still a significant number of hardcore extremists in the West and in Muslim countries -- who are willing to join bin Laden's terrorist outfit.

The insider descriptions provided by Vinas and Othmani indicate that these violent extremists are as motivated as any of their predecessors.

Their accounts also indicate that the al Qaeda network has demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt its operations to a much harsher security environment.

But Vinas and Othmani's accounts also suggest that al Qaeda may be having leadership problems.

While able to find fresh recruits to replace those killed and arrested it seems to have more difficulty replacing senior military trainers and other key operational figures.

A former U.S. government official, specializing in counter-terrorism, commented that the insider accounts suggest the same people are leading training as a decade ago.

The only difference, there are fewer of them. Perhaps those killed or captured along the Afghan/Pakistan border are not being replaced.

Recent reports that al Qaeda is moving some operatives out of the tribal areas of Pakistan towards safer placements in Pakistani cities, or to Jihadist fronts in other countries such as Yemen and Somalia, may indicate that the pressure from U.S. missile strikes is starting to show.

But the decentralization of al Qaeda's training and their ever closer ties with local Pakistani Taliban, mean it remains extremely difficult to eliminate from the mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Above all the accounts from Vinas and others show that al Qaeda's training structures have but one goal, another 9/11.