NYT : Material Given to Congress In 2002 Is Now Classified

Material Given to Congress In 2002 Is Now Classified

By ERIC LICHTBLAU | Washington | May 19, 2004

The Justice Department has taken the unusual step of retroactively classifying information it gave to Congress nearly two years ago regarding a former F.B.I. translator who charged that the bureau had missed critical terrorist warnings, officials said Wednesday.

Law enforcement officials say the secrecy surrounding the translator, Sibel Edmonds, is essential to protecting information that could reveal intelligence-gathering operations. But some members of Congress and Congressional aides said they were troubled by the move, which comes as critics have accused the Bush administration of excessive secrecy.

''What the F.B.I. is up to here is ludicrous,'' Senator Charles E. Grassley, Republican of Iowa, said in an interview. ''To classify something that's already been out in the public domain, what do you accomplish? It does harm to transparency in government, and it looks like an attempt to cover up the F.B.I.'s problems in translating intelligence.''

F.B.I. officials gave Senate staff members two briefings in June and July of 2002 concerning Ms. Edmonds, who said the F.B.I.'s system for translating intelligence was so flawed that the bureau missed chances to spot terrorist warnings.

But the F.B.I. now maintains that some of the information discussed was so potentially damaging if released publicly that it is now considered classified, according to a memorandum distributed last week within the Senate Judiciary Committee. The material could also play a part in pending lawsuits, including Ms. Edmonds's wrongful termination suit and a lawsuit brought by hundreds of families of Sept. 11 victims who have sought to take testimony from her.

''Any staffer who attended those briefings, or who learns about those briefings, should be aware that the F.B.I. now considers the information classified and should therefore avoid further dissemination,'' the Judiciary Committee memorandum said.

An F.B.I. official who spoke on condition of anonymity said the decision to classify the material was made by the Justice Department, which oversees the bureau. The Justice Department declined to comment on Wednesday.

The F.B.I. told Congressional officials that it was classifying topics including what languages Ms. Edmonds translated, what types of cases she handled, and what employees she worked with, officials said. Even routine and widely disseminated information -- like where she worked -- is now classified.

Ms. Edmonds, who is Turkish-American, began working for the F.B.I. shortly after the Sept. 11 attacks as a translator in the F.B.I.'s Washington field office with top-secret security clearance, but she was let go in the spring of 2002. She first gained wide public attention in October of that year when she appeared on ''60 Minutes'' on CBS and charged that the F.B.I.'s translation services were plagued by incompetence and a lack of urgency and that the bureau had ignored her concerns. The Justice Department's inspector general is investigating her claims.

The F.B.I. has taken steps to improve its translation operations, including hiring more linguists. But Senator Patrick J. Leahy of Vermont, the ranking Democrat on the Judiciary Committee, wrote in March to the Justice Department that he still had ''grave concerns'' about the F.B.I.'s ability to translate vital counterterrorism material.

Ms. Edmonds testified in a closed session this year before the Sept. 11 commission, and she has made increasingly vehement charges about the F.B.I.'s intelligence failures, saying the United States had advance warnings about the attacks. Families of the Sept. 11 victims -- who are suing numerous corporate and Saudi interests whom they accuse of having links to the attacks -- have sought to depose her as a witness, but the Justice Department has blocked the move by saying her testimony would violate ''the state secret privilege.'' Her lawyer could not be reached for comment on Wednesday.

While some Congressional officials said they were confident the Justice Department had followed proper procedure in classifying the information, others said they could not remember any recent precedents and were bothered by the move.

''I have never heard of a retroactive classification two years back,'' said an aide who spoke on condition of anonymity because the subject is classified.

''It would be silly if it didn't have such serious implications,'' the aide said. ''People are puzzled and, frankly, worried, because the effect here is to quash Congressional oversight. We don't even know what we can't talk about.''

Senator Grassley said, ''This is about as close to a gag order as you can get.''

The F.B.I. denied the accusation.

''We're not imposing a gag order,'' the F.B.I. official said. Members of Congress have the information, but have to treat it as classified, the official said. ''The problem is that while these pieces of information may look innocuous on their own, you put them all together and it reveals a picture of sensitive intelligence collection, and that's a security problem.''

American Conservative: Philip Giraldi: Deep Background

Philip Giraldi: Deep Backgrounds

Sibel Edmonds, the Turkish FBI translator turned whistleblower who has been subjected to a gag order could provide a major insight into how neoconservatives distort US foreign policy and enrich themselves at the same time. On one level, her story appears straightforward: several Turkish lobbying groups allegedly bribed congressmen to support policies favourable to Ankara. But beyond that, the Edmonds revelations become more serpentine and appear to involve AIPAC, Israel and a number of leading neoconservatives who have profited from the Turkish connection. Israel has long cultivated a close relationship with Turkey since Ankara's neighbours and historic enemies - Iran, Syria and Iraq - are also hostile to Tel Aviv. Islamic Turkey has also had considerable symbolic value for Israel, demonstrating that hostility to Muslim neighbours is not a sine qua non for the Jewish state.

Turkey benefits from the relationship by securing general benevolence and increased aid from the US Congress - as well as access to otherwise unattainable military technology. The Turkish General Staff has a particular interest because much of the military spending is channeled through companies in which the generals have a financial stake, making for a very cozy and comfortable business arrangement. The commercial interest has also fostered close political ties, with the American Turkish Council, American Turkish Cultural Alliance and the Assembly of Turkish American Associations all developing warm relationships with AIPAC and other Jewish and Israel advocacy groups throughout the US.

Someone has to be in the middle to keep the happy affair going, so enter the neocons, intent on securing Israel against all comers and also keen to turn a dollar. In fact the neocons seem to have a deep and abiding interest in Turkey, which, under other circumstances, might be difficult to explain. Doug Feith's International Advisors Inc, a registered agent for Turkey in 1989 - 1994, netted $600,000 per year from Turkey, with Richard Perle taking $48,000 annually as a consultant. Other noted neoconservatives linked to Turkey are former State Department number three, Marc Grossman, current Pentagon Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman, Paul Wolfowitz and former congressman Stephen Solarz. The money involved does not appear to come from the Turkish government, and FBI investigators are trying to determine its source and how it is distributed. Some of it may come from criminal activity, possibly drug trafficking, but much more might come from arms dealing. Contracts in the hundreds of millions, or even billions of dollars provide considerable fat for those well placed to benefit. Investigators are also looking at Israel's particular expertise in the illegal sale of US military technology to countries like China and India. Fraudulent end-user certificates produced by Defense Ministries in Israel and Turkey are all that is needed to divert military technology to other, less benign, consumers. The military-industrial-complex/neocon network is also well attested. Doug Feith has been associated with Northrup Grumman for years, while defense contractors fund many neocon-linked think tanks and "information" services. Feith, Perle and a number of other neocons have long had beneficial relationships with various Israeli defense contractors.

Asia Times: Letter to Thomas Kean from Sibel Edmonds

Letter to Thomas Kean from Sibel Edmonds

August 5, 2004

Dear Chairman Kean:

It has been almost three years since the terrorist attacks on September 11 [2001], during which time we, the people, have been placed under a constant threat of terror and asked to exercise vigilance in our daily lives. Your commission, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, was created by law to investigate "facts and circumstances related to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001" and to "provide recommendations to safeguard against future acts of terrorism", and has now issued its "9-11 Commission Report". You are now asking us to pledge our support for this report, its recommendations, and implementation of these recommendations, with our trust and backing, our tax money, our security, and our lives. Unfortunately, I find your report seriously flawed in its failure to address serious intelligence issues that I am aware of, which have been confirmed, and which as a witness to the commission, I made you aware of. Thus I must assume that other serious issues that I am not aware of were in the same manner omitted from your report. These omissions cast doubt on the validity of your report and therefore on its conclusions and recommendations. Considering what is at stake, our national security, we are entitled to demand answers to unanswered questions, and to ask for clarification of issues that were ignored and/or omitted from the report. I, Sibel Edmonds, a concerned American citizen, a former FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] translator, a whistleblower, a witness for a United States congressional investigation, a witness and a plaintiff for the Department of Justice inspector general investigation, and a witness for your own 9-11 Commission investigation, request your answers to, and your public acknowledgement of, the following questions and issues:

After the terrorist attacks of September 11 we, the translators at the FBI's largest and most important translation unit, were told to slow down, even stop, translation of critical information related to terrorist activities so that the FBI could present the United States Congress with a record of "extensive backlog of untranslated documents", and justify its request for budget and staff increases. While FBI agents from various field offices were desperately seeking leads and suspects, and completely depending on FBI HQ and its language units to provide them with needed translated information, hundreds of translators were being told by their administrative supervisors not to translate and to let the work pile up (please refer to the CBS 60 Minutes transcript dated October 2002, and provided to your investigators in January-February 2004). This issue has been confirmed by the Senate Judiciary Committee (please refer to Senator [Charles] Grassley's and Senator [Patrick] Leahy's letters during the summer of 2002, provided to your investigators in January-February 2004). This confirmed report has been reported to be substantiated by the Department of Justice Inspector General Report (please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your report). I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue and the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this (please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours' testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11, 2004).

Today, almost three years after [September 11], and more than two years since this information has been confirmed and made available to our government, the administrators in charge of language departments of the FBI remain in their positions and in charge of the information front lines of the FBI's counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence efforts. Your report has omitted any reference to this most serious issue, has forgone any accountability whatsoever, and your recommendations have refrained from addressing this issue, which when left unaddressed will have even more serious consequences. This issue is systemic and departmental. Why did your report choose to exclude this information and this serious issue despite the evidence and briefings you received? How can budget increases address and resolve this misconduct by mid-level bureaucratic management? How can the addition of a new bureaucratic layer, "intelligence czar", in its cocoon removed from the action lines, address and resolve this problem?

Melek Can Dickerson, a Turkish translator, was hired by the FBI after September 11, and was placed in charge of translating the most sensitive information related to terrorists and criminals under the bureau's investigation. Melek Can Dickerson was granted Top Secret Clearance, which can be granted only after conducting a thorough background investigation. Melek Can Dickerson used to work for a semi-legit organizations that were the FBI's targets of investigation. Melek Can Dickerson had on going relationships with two individuals who were FBI's targets of investigation. For months Melek Can Dickerson blocked all-important information related to these semi-legit organizations and the individuals she and her husband associated with. She stamped hundreds, if not thousands, of documents related to these targets as "Not Pertinent". Melek Can Dickerson attempted to prevent others from translating these documents important to the FBI's investigations and our fight against terrorism. Melek Can Dickerson, with the assistance of her direct supervisor, Mike Feghali, took hundreds of pages of top-secret sensitive intelligence documents outside the FBI to unknown recipients. Melek Can Dickerson, with the assistance of her direct supervisor, forged signatures on top-secret documents related to certain [September 11-related] detainees. After all these incidents were confirmed and reported to FBI management, Melek Can Dickerson was allowed to remain in her position, to continue the translation of sensitive intelligence received by the FBI, and to maintain her Top Secret Clearance. Apparently bureaucratic mid-level FBI management and administrators decided that it would not look good for the bureau if this security breach and espionage case was investigated and made public, especially after going through Robert Hanssen's case (FBI spy scandal). This case (Melek Can Dickerson) was confirmed by the Senate Judiciary Committee (please refer to Senator Leahy's and Grassley's letters dated June 19 and August 13, 2002, and Senator Grassley's statement on CBS 60 Minutes in October 2002, provided to your investigators in January-February 2004). This Dickerson incident received major coverage by the press (please refer to media background provided to your investigators in January-February 2004). According to [FBI] director [Robert] Mueller, the inspector general criticized the FBI for failing to adequately pursue this espionage report regarding Melek Can Dickerson (please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your report). I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue, the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this, and additional documents (please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours' testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11, 2004).

Today, more than two years since the Dickerson incident was reported to the FBI, and more than two years since this information was confirmed by the United States Congress and reported by the press, these administrators in charge of FBI personnel security and language departments in the FBI remain in their positions and in charge of translation quality and translation departments' security. Melek Can Dickerson and several FBI targets of investigation hastily left the United States in 2002, and the case still remains uninvestigated criminally. Not only does the supervisor facilitating these criminal conducts remain in a supervisory position, he has been promoted to supervising Arabic-language units of the FBI's counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence investigations. Your report has omitted these significant incidents, has forgone any accountability whatsoever, and your recommendations have refrained from addressing this serious information security breach and highly likely espionage issue. This issue needs to be investigated and criminally prosecuted. The translation of our intelligence is being entrusted to individuals with loyalties to our enemies. Important "chit-chats" and "chatters" are being intentionally blocked. Why did your report choose to exclude this information and these serious issues despite the evidence and briefings you received? How can budget increases address and resolve this misconduct by mid-level bureaucratic management? How can the addition of a new bureaucratic layer, "intelligence czar", in its cocoon removed from the action lines, address and resolve this problem?

Over three years ago, more than four months prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks, in April 2001, a long-term FBI informant/asset who had been providing the bureau with information since 1990, provided two FBI agents and a translator with specific information regarding a terrorist attack being planned by Osama bin Laden. This asset/informant was previously a high-level intelligence officer in Iran in charge of intelligence from Afghanistan. Through his contacts in Afghanistan he received information that: 1) Osama Bin Laden was planning a major terrorist attack in the United States targeting four to five major cities, 2) the attack was going to involve airplanes, 3) some of the individuals in charge of carrying out this attack were already in place in the United States, 4) the attack was going to be carried out soon, in a few months. The agents who received this information reported it to their superior, Special Agent in Charge of Counter-terrorism Thomas Frields, at the FBI Washington Field Office, by filing "302" forms, and the translator translated and documented this information. No action was taken by the special agent in charge, and after [September 11] the agents and the translators were told to "keep quiet" regarding this issue. The translator who was present during the session with the FBI informant, Mr Behrooz Sarshar, reported this incident to director Mueller in writing, and later to the Department of Justice inspector general. The press reported this incident, and in fact the report in the Chicago Tribune on July 21, 2004, stated that FBI officials had confirmed that this information was received in April 2001, and further, the Chicago Tribune quoted an aide to director Mueller that he (Mueller) was surprised that the commission never raised this particular issue with him during the hearing (please refer to Chicago Tribune article, dated July 21, 2004). Mr Sarshar reported this issue to your investigators on February 12, 2004, and provided them with specific dates, location, witness names, and the contact information for that particular Iranian asset and the two special agents who received the information (please refer to the tape-recorded testimony provided to your investigators during a 2.5 hours' testimony by Mr Sarshar on February 12, 2004). I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue, the names of other witnesses, and documents I had seen (please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours' testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11, 2004). Mr Sarshar also provided the Department of Justice inspector general with specific information regarding this issue (please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your report).

After almost three years since September 11, many officials still refuse to admit to having specific information regarding the terrorists' plans to attack the United States. The Phoenix Memo, received months prior to the [September 11] attacks, specifically warned FBI HQ of pilot training and their possible link to terrorist activities against the United States. Four months prior to the terrorist attacks the Iranian asset provided the FBI with specific information regarding the "use of airplanes", "major US cities as targets", and "Osama bin Laden issuing the order". Coleen Rowley likewise reported that specific information had been provided to FBI HQ. All this information went to the same place: FBI Headquarters in Washington, DC, and the FBI Washington Field Office, in Washington DC. Yet your report claims that not having a central place where all intelligence could be gathered as one of the main factors in our intelligence failure. Why did your report choose to exclude the information regarding the Iranian asset and Behrooz Sarshar from its timeline of missed opportunities? Why was this significant incident not mentioned, despite the public confirmation by the FBI, witnesses provided to your investigators, and briefings you received directly? Why did you surprise even director Mueller by refraining from asking him questions regarding this significant incident and lapse during your hearing (please remember that you ran out of questions during your hearings with director Mueller and [Attorney General] John Ashcroft, so please do not cite a "time limit" excuse)? How can budget increases address and resolve these problems and failure to follow up by mid-level bureaucratic management at FBI Headquarters? How can the addition of a new bureaucratic layer, "intelligence czar", in its cocoon removed from the action lines, address and resolve this problem?

Over two years ago, and after two "unclassified" sessions with FBI officials, the Senate Judiciary Committee sent letters to director Mueller, Attorney General Ashcroft, and Inspector General Glenn Fine regarding the existence of unqualified translators in charge of translating high level sensitive intelligence. The FBI confirmed at least one case: Kevin Taskesen, a Turkish translator, had been given a job as an FBI translator, despite the fact that he had failed all FBI language proficiency tests. In fact, Kevin could not understand or speak even elementary-level English. He had failed English-proficiency tests and did not even score sufficiently in the target language. Still, Kevin Taskesen was hired, not due to lack of other qualified translator candidates, but because his wife worked in FBI Headquarters as a language proficiency exam administrator. Almost everybody in FBI Headquarters and the FBI Washington Field Office knew about Kevin. Yet Kevin was given the task of translating the most sensitive terrorist-related information, and he was sent to Guantanamo Bay to translate the interrogation of and information for all Turkic-language detainees (Turkish, Uzbek, Turkmen, etc). The FBI was supposed to be trying to obtain information regarding possible future attack plans from these detainees, and yet the FBI knowingly sent unqualified translators to gather and translate this information. Further, these detainees were either released or detained or prosecuted based on information received and translated by unqualified translators knowingly sent there by the FBI. Senator Grassley and Senator Leahy publicly confirmed Kevin Taskesen's case (please refer to Senate letters and documents provided to your investigators in January-February 2004). CBS 60 Minutes showed Kevin's picture and stated his name as one of the unqualified translators sent to Guantanamo Bay, and as a case confirmed by the FBI (please refer to CBS 60 Minutes transcript provided to your investigators). Department of Justice inspector general had a detailed account of these problems (please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your report). I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue and the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this (please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours' testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11, 2004).

After more than two years since Kevin Taskesen's case was publicly confirmed, and after almost two years since CBS 60 Minutes broadcast Taskesen's case, Kevin Taskesen remains in his position, as a sole Turkish- and Turkic-language translator for the FBI Washington Field Office. After admitting that Kevin Taskesen was not qualified to perform the task of translating sensitive intelligence and investigation of terrorist activities, the FBI still keeps him in charge of translating highly sensitive documents and leads. Those individuals in the FBI's hiring department and those who facilitated the hiring of unqualified translators due to nepotism/cronyism are still in those departments and remain in their positions. Yet your report does not mention this case, or these chronic problems within the FBI translation departments, and within the FBI's hiring and screening departments. The issue of accountability for those responsible for these practices that endangers our national security is not brought up even once in your report. This issue, as with others, is systemic and departmental. Why did your report choose to exclude this information and these serious issues despite the evidence and briefings you received? How can budget increases address and resolve the intentional continuation of ineptitude and incompetence by mid-level bureaucratic management? How can the addition of a new bureaucratic layer, "intelligence czar", in its cocoon removed from the action lines, address and resolve this problem?

In October 2001, approximately one month after the September 11 attack, an agent from a [city name omitted] field office, re-sent a certain document to the FBI Washington Field Office, so that it could be re-translated. This special agent, in light of the [September 11] terrorist attacks, rightfully believed that, considering his target of investigation (the suspect under surveillance), and the issues involved, the original translation might have missed certain information that could prove to be valuable in the investigation of terrorist activities. After this document was received by the FBI Washington Field Office and re-translated verbatim, the field agent's hunch appeared to be correct. The new translation revealed certain information regarding blueprints, pictures, and building material for skyscrapers being sent overseas. It also revealed certain illegal activities in obtaining visas from certain embassies in the Middle East, through network contacts and bribery. However, after the re-translation was completed and the new significant information was revealed, the unit supervisor in charge of certain Middle Eastern languages, Mike Feghali, decided not to send the re-translated information to the special agent who had requested it. Instead, this supervisor decided to send this agent a note stating that the translation was reviewed and that the original translation was accurate. This supervisor stated that sending the accurate translation would hurt the original translator and would cause problems for the FBI language department. The FBI agent requesting the re-translation never received the accurate translation of that document. I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue, the name and date of this particular investigation, and the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this (please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours' testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11, 2004). This information was also provided to the Department of Justice inspector general (please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your report).

Only one month after the catastrophic events of September 11, while many agents were working around the clock to obtain leads and information, and to investigate those responsible for the attacks, those with possible connections to the attack, and those who might be planning possible future attacks, the bureaucratic administrators in the FBI's largest and most important translation unit were covering up their past failures, blocking important leads and information, and jeopardizing on going terrorist investigations. The supervisor involved in this incident, Mike Feghali, was in charge of certain important Middle Eastern languages within the FBI Washington Field Office, and had a record of previous misconducts. After this supervisor's several severe misconducts were reported to the FBI's higher-level management, after his conducts were reported to the Inspector General's Office, to the United States Congress, and to the 9-11 Commission, he was promoted to include the FBI's Arabic-language unit under his supervision. Today this supervisor, Mike Feghali, remains in the FBI Washington Field Office and is in charge of a language unit receiving those chitchats that our color-coded threat system is based upon. Yet your report contains zero information regarding these systemic problems that led us to our failure in preventing the [September 11] terrorist attacks. In your report, there are no references to individuals responsible for hindering past and current investigations, or those who are willing to compromise our security and our lives for their career advancement and security. This issue, as with others, is systemic and departmental. Why does your report choose to exclude this information and these serious issues despite all the evidence and briefings you received? Why does your report adamantly refrain from assigning any accountability to any individuals responsible for our past and current failures? How can budget increases address and resolve these intentional acts committed by self-serving career civil servants? How can the addition of a new bureaucratic layer, "intelligence czar", in its cocoon removed from the action lines, address and resolve this problem?

The latest buzz topic regarding intelligence is the problem of sharing information/intelligence within intelligence agencies and between intelligence agencies. To this date the public has not been told of intentional blocking of intelligence, and has not been told that certain information, despite its direct links, impacts and ties to terrorist related activities, is not given to or shared with counter-terrorism units, their investigations, and countering terrorism related activities. This was the case prior to [September 11], and remains in effect after [September 11]. If counter-intelligence receives information that contains money laundering, illegal arms sale, and illegal drug activities, directly linked to terrorist activities, and if that information involves certain nations, certain semi-legit organizations, and ties to certain lucrative or political relations in this country, then that information is not shared with counter-terrorism, regardless of the possible severe consequences. In certain cases, frustrated FBI agents cited "direct pressure by the State Department", and in other cases "sensitive diplomatic relations" is cited. The Department of Justice inspector general received detailed and specific information and evidence regarding this issue (please refer to DOJ-IG report Re: Sibel Edmonds and FBI Translation, provided to you prior to the completion of your report). I provided your investigators with a detailed and specific account of this issue, the names of other witnesses willing to corroborate this, and the names of certain U.S. officials involved in these transactions and activities (please refer to tape-recorded 3.5 hours' testimony by Sibel Edmonds, provided to your investigators on February 11, 2004).

After almost three years the American people still do not know that thousands of lives can be jeopardized under the unspoken policy of "protecting certain foreign business relations". The victims' family members still do not realize that information and answers they have sought relentlessly for over two years has been blocked due to the unspoken decisions made and disguised under "safeguarding certain diplomatic relations". Your report did not even attempt to address these unspoken practices, although, unlike me, you were not placed under any gag. Your hearings did not include questions regarding these unspoken and unwritten policies and practices. Despite your full awareness and understanding of certain criminal conduct that connects to certain terrorist related activities, committed by certain US officials and high-level government employees, you have not proposed criminal investigations into this conduct, although under the laws of this country you are required to do so. How can budget increases address and resolve these problems, when some of them are caused by unspoken practices and unwritten policies? How can a new bureaucratic layer, "intelligence czar", in its cocoon removed from the action lines, override these unwritten policies and unspoken practices incompatible with our national security?

I know for a fact that problems regarding intelligence translation cannot be brushed off as minor problems among many significant problems. Translation units are the front line in gathering, translating, and disseminating intelligence. A warning in advance of the next terrorist attack may, and probably will, come in the form of a message or document in foreign language that will have to be translated. That message may be given to the translation unit headed and supervised by someone like Mike Feghali, who slows down, even stops, translations for the purpose of receiving budget increases for his department, who has participated in certain criminal activities and security breaches, and who has been engaged in covering up failures and criminal conducts within the department, so it may never be translated in time if ever. That message may go to Kevin Taskesen, or another unqualified translator; so it may never be translated correctly and be acted upon. That message may go to a sympathizer within the language department; so it may never be translated fully, if at all. That message may come to the attention of an agent of a foreign organization who works as a translator in the FBI translation department, who may choose to block it; so it may never get translated. If then an attack occurs, which could have been prevented by acting on information in that message, who will tell family members of the new terrorist attack victims that nothing more could have been done? There will be no excuse that we did not know, because we do know.

I am writing this letter in light of my direct experience within the FBI's translation unit during the most crucial times after the [September 11] terrorist attacks, in light of my first hand knowledge of certain problems and cases within the bureau's language units, and in light of what has already been established as facts. As you are fully aware, the facts, incidents, and problems cited in this letter are by no means based upon personal opinion or un-verified allegations. As you are fully aware, these issues and incidents were found confirmed by a senior Republican senator, Charles Grassley, and a senior Democrat senator, Patrick Leahy. As you know, according to officials with direct knowledge of the Department of Justice inspector general's report on my allegations, "none of my allegations were disproved". As you are fully aware, even FBI officials "confirmed all my allegations and denied none" during their unclassified meetings with the Senate Judiciary staff over two years ago. However, neither your commission's hearings, nor your commission's 567-page report, nor your recommendations include these serious issues, major incidents, and systemic problems. Your report's coverage of FBI translation problems consists of a brief microscopic footnote (Footnote 25). Yet your commission is geared to start aggressively pressuring our government to hastily implement your measures and recommendations based upon your incomplete and deficient report.

In order to cure a problem, one must have an accurate diagnosis. In order to correctly diagnose a problem, one must consider and take into account all visible symptoms. Your commission's investigations, hearings, and report have chosen not to consider many visible symptoms. I am emphasizing "visible", because these symptoms have been long recognized by experts from the intelligence community and have been written about in the press. I am emphasizing "visible" because the few specific symptoms I provided you with in this letter have been confirmed and publicly acknowledged. During its many hearings your commission chose not to ask the questions necessary to unveil the true symptoms of our failed intelligence system. Your commission intentionally bypassed these severe symptoms, and chose not to include them in its 567-page report. Now, without a complete list of our failures pre-[September 11], without a comprehensive examination of true symptoms that exist in our intelligence system, without assigning any accountability whatsoever, and therefore, without a sound and reliable diagnosis, your commission is attempting to divert attention from the real problems, and to prescribe a cure through hasty and costly measures. It is like attempting to put a gold-lined expensive porcelain cap over a deeply decayed tooth with a rotten root, without first treating the root, and without first cleaning/shaving the infected tooth.

Respectfully

Sibel D Edmonds

CC: Senate Judiciary Committee
CC: Senate Intelligence Committee
CC: House Government Reform Committee
CC: Family Steering Committee
CC: Press

Investor's Business Daily: Sudden Jihad Syndrome

Sudden Jihad Syndrome

INVESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY | Posted 2/16/2007

Terror: It looks like the Muslim teen who opened fire on shoppers in a Salt Lake City mall is yet another case of "sudden jihad syndrome," a condition in which normal-appearing American Muslims abruptly turn violent.

Taken together, this and other cases add up to an invisible jihad inside America. But don't tell that to the FBI. The politically correct bureau does everything it can to avoid recognizing the obvious Islamic factor in these heinous crimes.

Sulejman Talovic, an 18-year-old Bosnian Muslim immigrant, was loaded with enough ammo to "inexplicably" kill dozens of victims — and he would have, if an alert off-duty cop hadn't returned fire and stopped him. Talovic still managed to methodically murder five and wound four others with a shotgun.

Witnesses say it was an act of coldblooded violence aimed at random victims — something otherwise known as terrorism. According to the Salt Lake Tribune, Talovic attended Friday prayers at a mosque about a block from the mall.

Yet the FBI saw no religious motive, and quickly ruled out terrorism. Nor could it find anything to indicate terrorism in several other Muslim-tied cases since 9/11, including:

• A 30-year-old Muslim man, Naveed Afzal Haq, who went on a shooting rampage at a Jewish community center in Seattle, announcing "I'm a Muslim-American; I'm angry at Israel."

• An Egyptian national, Hesham Mohamed Hadayet, who shot two and wounded three at an Israeli airline ticket counter at LAX.

• A bearded 21-year-old student, Joel Hinrichs, who blew himself up with a backpack filled with TATP (the explosive of choice in the Mideast) outside a packed Oklahoma University football stadium not long after he started attending the local mosque.

• A 23-year-old student, Mohammed Ali Alayed, who slashed the throat of his Jewish friend in Houston after apparently undergoing a religious awakening (he went to a local mosque afterward).

• The D.C. snipers — John Muhammad and Lee Malvo, both black Muslim converts — who picked off 13 people in the suburbs around the Beltway as part of what Muhammad described as a "prolonged terror campaign against America" around the first anniversary of 9/11, which he had praised.

• Omeed Aziz Popal of Fremont, Calif., who police said hit and killed a bicyclist there then took his SUV on a hit-and-run spree in San Francisco, mowing down pedestrians at crosswalks and on sidewalks before police caught up with him, whereupon the Muslim called himself a "terrorist."

• A 22-year-old Muslim, Ismail Yassin Mohamed, who stole a car in Minneapolis and rammed it into other cars before stealing a van and doing the same, injuring drivers and pedestrians, while repeatedly yelling, "Die, die, die, kill, kill, kill" — all, he said, on orders from "Allah."

• A 22-year-old Iranian honors student, Mohammed Reza Taheri-azar, who deliberately rammed his SUV into a crowd at the University of North Carolina to "punish the government of the United States" for invading Iraq and other Muslim nations.

Described by other students as "kind and gentle," Taheri-azar was a student council president and a member of the National Honor Society in high school. He told the judge he was "thankful you're here to learn more about the will of Allah."

He wrote a letter to a TV station citing Quranic verses justifying his attacks and told a detective that Muslims "all over the world are being killed, and now it is the people in the United States' turn to be killed."

This is not terrorism, the FBI said. Just some nutty kid. In all these cases, the feds' first reaction was to shrug. They said the perps were lone individuals who just went ballistic after having a bad day, as if anyone could have done such crimes.

But they weren't just anyone. They were all young Muslim men. Of course, the FBI can't treat all law-abiding young Muslim men as potential killers. But neither should the agency ignore this trend.

We're likely to see more of these seemingly random domestic attacks. They may seem isolated, but all have radical Islam at their nexus. They're not "senseless" or "utterly inexplicable" or "impossible to rationalize," as the media intone. They are purposeful. These men act as conscripts called up for a mission, sick as it is.

NYT : Iraqis Reach an Accord on Oil Revenues

Iraqis Reach an Accord on Oil Revenues

By EDWARD WONG | February 27, 2007

BAGHDAD, Feb. 26 — The Iraqi cabinet approved a draft of a law on Monday that would set guidelines for nationwide distribution of oil revenues and foreign investment in the immense oil industry. The endorsement reflected a major agreement among the country’s ethnic and sectarian political blocs on one of Iraq’s most divisive issues.

The draft law approved by the cabinet allows the central government to distribute oil revenues to the provinces or regions based on population, which could lessen the economic concerns of the rebellious Sunni Arabs, who fear being cut out of Iraq’s vast potential oil wealth by the dominant Shiites and Kurds. Most of Iraq’s crude oil reserves lie in the Shiite south and Kurdish north.

The law also grants regional oil companies or governments the power to sign contracts with foreign companies for exploration and development of fields, opening the door for investment by foreign companies in a country whose oil reserves rank among the world’s three largest.

Iraqi officials say dozens of major foreign companies, including ones based in the United States, Russia and China, have expressed strong interest in developing fields or have done some work with the Iraqi industry. The national oil law would allow regions to enter into production-sharing agreements with foreign companies, which some Iraqis say could lead to foreigners reaping too much of the country’s oil wealth.

Iraqi officials say all such contracts will be subjected to a fair bidding process, but American inspectors have reported that the upper echelons of the government, including the senior ranks of the Oil Ministry, are rife with corruption. There are also fears among non-Americans that American companies could be favored.

But oil industry analysts in the United States say it is unclear whether companies will rush to sign contracts because the law is vague about what legal protections investors would be given.

The oil law and several related measures must still be approved by Parliament before they are enacted. Since the American-led invasion in 2003, Iraqi politics have often been split bitterly along ethnic and sectarian lines, and that kind of conflict could stall the law’s passage. Drafts were debated for months by a committee before the cabinet finally approved one.

“At the end of the day, we all supported this thing because it’s workable for all the parties,” said Barham Salih, a deputy prime minister and the head of the committee.

Distributing revenue by population is not guaranteed to placate the feuding parties because no accurate census exists. There is intense disagreement over demographics in Iraq — many Sunni Arabs insist they are the majority of Iraqis, even though Sunni Arabs are generally estimated to be 20 percent of the population, Kurds 20 percent and Shiite Arabs 60 percent.

If the law is passed, its effect on the oil industry could be enormous, assuming that foreign companies would be willing to work here despite the violence. Iraq has 80 known oil fields, 65 of which will be offered for bids for development contracts, said Hussain al-Shahristani, the oil minister.

Iraqi leaders say they want the 275-member Parliament to approve the law before May. The legislature is in recess but is expected to reconvene next month. American and Iraqi leaders had tried to get the law approved last year, but the effort bogged down at the drafting level. Before the cabinet vote on Monday, the main Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish political blocs agreed to work together to ensure that the law passes Parliament in an expeditious manner, Mr. Shahristani said.

Since last year, senior Bush administration officials and top American commanders here have said a new oil law is crucial to the country’s political and economic development, and they have pressured Iraqi leaders relentlessly to make passage of the law a priority.

In recent weeks, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, the senior American envoy here, has been in intense talks with Kurdish leaders in the north to overcome their objections to the draft, which centered on the contracting powers given to the central government versus the regions. Iraqi officials say Mr. Khalilzad’s negotiations were crucial to winning unanimous cabinet approval on Monday.

“This is a significant political achievement because leaders representing all of Iraq’s communities have demonstrated that they can pull together to resolve difficult issues of vital national importance,” Mr. Khalilzad said in a written statement on Monday evening. “The drafting of this framework law was not easy. It presented special challenges for the Iraqi and Kurdistan regional governments, and the leaders of key political blocs.”

Several members of the committee overseeing the drafting said in interviews that they were confident that Parliament would ultimately endorse the law, but perhaps only after heated debate.

“It will be tough,” Mr. Salih said. “I want to admit it and I want to recognize that. It will be an interesting roller coaster, my friends.”

The writers of the draft law tried to balance the powers of regional and central governments, an issue that goes directly to the heart of the Iraq war.

The minority Sunni Arabs, who ruled Iraq for decades before the toppling of Saddam Hussein and are now leading the insurgency, have chafed at rule by the Shiites and Kurds partly because they fear that those two groups might hoard oil wealth for themselves. Sunni Arab leaders have resisted attempts by the Kurds and some Shiite politicians to create laws allowing for greater regional autonomy.

The draft law says that all revenues from current and future oil fields will be collected by the central government and redistributed to regional or provincial governments by population, in theory ensuring an equitable distribution of profits. That method could help assuage Sunni Arabs hostile to Kurdish and Shiite autonomy.

The attitudes of Sunni Arabs could also soften if more oil exploration is done on their land. Iraqi officials recently increased their estimates of the amount of oil and natural gas deposits in Sunni Arab territory after paying tens of millions of dollars to foreign oil companies to re-examine old seismic data across the country and retrain Iraqi petroleum engineers.

Industry and government analysts in and outside Iraq estimate the proven oil reserves at 115 billion barrels. Oil production peaked at 3.7 million barrels a day in 1979, according to the United States Department of Energy. Production stood at 2.6 million barrels a day before the 2003 invasion, but has dropped since.

The oil law’s drafters reached agreement on the principle of revenue sharing fairly early in the process. Much more contentious was the issue of signing oil contracts. The Kurds, who have enjoyed de facto independence in the mountainous north since the end of the Persian Gulf war in 1991, argued strongly for regional governments or companies to have full power in signing contracts with foreign companies to develop oil fields. Sunni Arab leaders insisted on keeping this power in the hands of the Oil Ministry. The Shiites fell somewhere in the middle.

The draft law has a compromise: regions can enter into contracts, but a powerful new central body, the Federal Oil and Gas Council, would have the power to prevent the contracts from going forward if they do not meet certain prescribed standards, Mr. Salih said. A panel of oil experts from inside and outside Iraq would advise the federal council on the contracts.

The draft law also re-establishes the state-run Iraq National Oil Company, which was founded in 1964 to oversee oil production but was shut down by Mr. Hussein in 1987. The company would operate separately from the Oil Ministry and use a business model. In addition, any region that can produce at least 150,000 barrels of oil a day can create its own operating company.

Energy analysts said the new law is unlikely to lead to a stampede by foreign companies anytime soon because it leaves too many unresolved issues, including the lack of a mechanism to settle potential disputes between the federal authority and local governments.

“I think the devil is going to be in the details,” said Fadel Gheit, an analyst with Oppenheimer & Company in New York. “Oil companies need governments that will honor the contracts they sign and they need a safe environment to operate,” he added.

While Mr. Gheit said he expected American and British oil companies to receive preferential treatment in the awarding of contracts, other analysts said Iraqis would be suspicious of awarding preferential deals to American companies.

“Iraqis are extremely protective of their resources,” said Rochdi A. Younsi, an analyst at Eurasia Group, a political risk consulting firm. “Given the level of anti-American sentiment, any major American oil company perceived to take advantage of their relations in government would be seen as being part of the so-called conspiracy to take over Iraq’s natural resources.”

Jad Mouawad contributed reporting from New York.

NYT : Iraqi Cabinet Approves Draft of Oil Law

Iraqi Cabinet Approves Draft of Oil Law

By EDWARD WONG | February 26, 2007

BAGHDAD, Feb. 26 — The Iraqi cabinet approved a draft of a law today that would set guidelines for countrywide distribution of oil revenues and foreign investment in the immense oil industry.

The endorsement marked a major agreement among the country’s ethnic and sectarian political blocs on one of Iraq’s most divisive issues.

The draft law approved by the cabinet allows the central government to distribute oil revenues to the provinces or regions by population, which could lessen the economic concerns of the rebellious Sunni Arabs, who fear being cut out of Iraq’s vast potential oil wealth by the dominant Shiites and Kurds.

The law also grants regional oil companies the power to sign contracts with foreign companies for exploration and development of fields, opening the door for investment by foreign oil companies in a country whose oil reserves rank among the world’s top three in size.

Iraq has 80 known fields, 65 of which will be offered up for bids for development contracts once the draft law is approved by the Iraqi Parliament, said Hussain al-Shahristani, the Iraqi oil minister. The 275-member Parliament is in recess but is expected to look at the draft once it reconvenes next month, Mr. Shahristani said. Ahead of today’s cabinet vote, the main Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish political blocs had agreed to work together to ensure that the law passes Parliament in an expeditious manner, he added.

Since last year, senior Bush administration officials and top American commanders here have said a new oil law is crucial to the country’s political and economic development, and they have been pressuring Iraqi leaders to make passage of the law a priority. In recent weeks, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, the senior American envoy here, has been in intense talks with Kurdish leaders in the north to overcome their objections to the draft. Iraqi officials say Mr. Khalilzad’s negotiations were crucial to winning unanimous cabinet approval today.

Since the American-led invasion of 2003, Iraqi politics has often been split bitterly along ethnic and sectarian lines, and that kind of conflict could still stall passage of the oil law in Parliament. Drafts have been debated for months by a committee overseeing the writing of the law before the cabinet finally approved it.

“At the end of the day, we all supported this thing because it’s workable for all the parties and is all-inclusive,” said Barham Salih, a deputy prime minister and the head of the committee.

Several members of the committee said in interviews that they were confident that Parliament would ultimately endorse the law, but perhaps only after heated arguments.

“It will be tough,” Mr. Salih said. “I want to admit it and I want to recognize that. It will be an interesting roller coaster, my friends.”

The writers of the draft law tried to balance regional control of oil versus oversight by the central government, an issue directly tied to the widening violence in Iraq.

The minority Sunni Arabs, who ruled Iraq for decades before the toppling of Saddam Hussein and are now leading the insurgency, have chafed at rule by the Shiites and Kurds partly because they fear those two groups might hoard oil wealth for themselves. Most of Iraq’s crude oil reserves lie in the Shiite south and Kurdish north. Sunni Arab leaders have resisted attempts by the Kurds and some Shiite politicians to create laws allowing for greater regional autonomy.

The draft oil law says that all revenues from current and future oil fields will be collected by the central government and redistributed to regional or provincial governments by population, in theory ensuring an equitable distribution of oil. This could help calm Sunni Arabs hostile to Kurdish and Shiite autonomy.

The attitudes of Sunni Arabs could also soften if more oil exploration is done on their lands. Iraqi officials recently increased their estimates of the amount of oil and natural gas deposits on Sunni Arab territory after paying tens of millions to foreign oil companies to re-examine old seismic data across the country and retrain Iraqi petroleum engineers.

The drafters of the law reached agreement on the principle of revenue-sharing fairly early in the process. Much more contentious was the issue of signing oil contracts. The Kurds, who have enjoyed de facto independence in the mountainous north since the Persian Gulf war ended in 1991, argued strongly for regional governments to have full power in signing contracts with companies to develop oil fields. Sunni Arab leaders insisted on keeping this power in the hands of the Oil Ministry, and the Shiites fell somewhere in the middle.

The draft law has a compromise: regions can enter into contracts, but a powerful new central body called the Federal Oil and Gas Council would have the power to “prevent” the contracts from going forward if they do not meet certain prescribed standards, Mr. Salih said. A panel of oil experts from inside and outside Iraq would advise the federal council on the contracts.

Much of the wrangling over the draft law stemmed from the minutiae of language. Kurdish leaders insisted that the law not give the federal council the power to “approve” contracts signed by the regional governments. The council should only be able to “reject” contracts, the leaders said. In the end, Kurdish and Arab leaders compromised by agreeing to give the federal council the power to “prevent” contracts, Mr. Salih said.

SAIC : Jerome M. Hauer Joins SAIC's Center for Counterterrorism Technology and Analysis

Jerome M. Hauer Joins SAIC's Center for Counterterrorism Technology and Analysis

MCLEAN, VA | November 30, 1999

Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) today announced that Jerome M. Hauer is joining SAIC's Center for Counterterrorism Technology and Analysis (CCTA) as assistant vice president and associate director. Hauer will be responsible for assisting SAIC customers, including federal, state and local authorities, as they respond to the increased threat of domestic and international terrorism.

Hauer also will lead SAIC's efforts to develop a corporate crisis planning and response team to provide businesses with the resources necessary to manage crisis response exercises as well as unexpected incidents.

"Jerry Hauer has extensive experience in developing and implementing hazardous material response programs. His expertise in crisis management, fire safety and emergency medical response adds additional capabilities to our counterterrorism practice," said David Kay, director of SAIC's CCTA.

Jerry Hauer comes to SAIC after serving as the first Director and Commissioner of the newly created Mayor's Office of Emergency Management (OEM) for the City of New York. Reporting directly to the Mayor, Hauer has overseen the office that is designated as the on-scene coordinator of all multiple agency incidents throughout New York City. The OEM directs the City of New York's overall emergency response planning as well as specialized planning for response to chemical, biological, and nuclear-related incidents. Hauer also directed the design and implementation of New York City's state-of-the-art Emergency Operations Center.

Hauer has extensive training and experience in emergency medicine, firefighting, and hazard materials response. Prior to going to New York, Hauer worked for the State of Indiana where he served as executive director of the State Emergency Management Agency, director of the Department of Fire and Building Services, and chairman of the Board of the Public Safety Training Institute.

In 1983, Hauer joined IBM where he was responsible for the company's Hazardous Materials Response and Crisis Management and Fire Safety programs. Hauer produced a series of hazardous materials training videos that earned him the International Film and TC Critics of New York Bronze award in 1986.

Hauer has served on the National Academy of Sciences Institute of Medicine's committee to evaluate research and development (R&D) needs for improved civilian medical response to chemical or biological terrorism incidents. He also is co-authoring the rewrite of the World Health Organizations' monograph on chemical and biological weapons.

Hauer earned a bachelor's degree from New York University and a master's degree with a focus on emergency medical services at Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health. He conducted extensive research into trauma and cardiac surgery while at Johns Hopkins, Beth Israel Hospital, and Harvard Medical School. Hauer also served on the faculty of the Northeastern University Paramedic Program.

SAIC formed the CCTA in December 1997 to address the needs and requirements of virtually every respect of countering the threat of terrorism. The CCTA takes a comprehensive view of terrorist threats, including the full range of weapons of mass destruction, more traditional high explosives and cyber-threats to the national infrastructure.

SAIC is the largest employee-owned research and engineering company in the United States, providing information technology, systems integration and eSolutions to commercial and government customers. From science to solutions, SAIC engineers and scientists work to solve complex technical problems in national and homeland security, energy, the environment, space, telecommunications, health care and logistics. More information about SAIC can be found at www.saic.com.

Dartmouth : Biography of Jerome M. Hauer

Cyberterrorism: Regional and Local Response | Panelists | 2001

Jerome M. Hauer
Assistant Vice President, Science Applications International Corporation
Associate Director, Center for Counterterrorism Technology & Analysis

Jerome M. Hauer, one of the nation's leading experts on biological and chemical terrorism, recently left his post as Director of New York City's Office of Emergency Management (OEM) to join Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). Hauer, who served four years as the City's first OEM Director, will be SAIC's Assistant Vice President and Associate Director of Center for Counterterrorism Technology and Analysis.

During his tenure at OEM, Hauer was charged by the Mayor with coordinating the City's on-scene response to multi-agency emergencies. He was also given the responsibility of drafting the City's emergency response plans to natural and man-made events, including hurricanes and coastal flooding, as well as biological or chemical attacks.

Hauer has a Masters degree from the Johns Hopkins School of Public Health and over 20 years of experience in emergency management. He was recently selected to be one of six scientists to brief President Clinton on biological terrorism and has been asked by the World Health Organization to co-author a rewrite of its 1970 monograph on chemical and biological weapons. Hauer consults regularly with Scotland Yard and the Israeli military, and worked extensively with the Australian Government in its preparations for the 2000 Summer Olympics.

Hauer has served on the National Academy of Sciences Institute of Medicine's Committee to Evaluate R&D Needs for Improved Civilian Medical Response to Chemical or Biological Terrorism Incidents, and is an advisor the United States Capitol Police and the United States Marine Corps' Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force (C-BIRF). Hauer is also a member of the Johns Hopkins Working Group on Civilian Bio Defense, and is an advisor to the Department of Justice's Office of Justice Programs.

Copyright © 2001 Trustees of Dartmouth College. All rights reserved.

Reuters: CIA sounded out Italy about "renditions" in 2001

CIA sounded out Italy about "renditions" in 2001

Phil Stewart | Reuters | February 15, 2007

ROME -- The CIA spoke with Italy's spy chief about kidnapping terrorism suspects in Italy and flying them abroad days after the September 11 attacks, according to testimony being used to prosecute U.S. and Italian agents.

A former Italian intelligence chief's testimony obtained by Reuters records this conversation taking place about 16 months before prosecutors say the CIA grabbed a radical Muslim cleric in Milan and flew him to Egypt, where he says he was tortured.

A Milan judge is expected to decide on Friday whether to indict 26 Americans, most of them believed to be CIA agents, and six Italians for kidnapping. Washington and Rome have never acknowledged any role in the affair.

"(The CIA station chief in Rome) asked my opinion, 'What do you think' about the hypothesis of carrying out the strategy of so-called renditions," Gianfranco Battelli, head of military intelligence agency SISMI back in 2001, told prosecutors.

The deposition of Battelli, who stepped down long before the abduction and is not a defendant, says the CIA official "made explicit reference to the possibility of grabbing a terrorist suspect in Italy, taking him to an airport and from there boarding him to a foreign country".

If Judge Caterina Interlandi orders a trial, it would be the world's first criminal case over renditions -- one of the most controversial aspects of U.S. President George W. Bush's "war on terror".

Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, also known as Abu Omar, says he was tortured under interrogation in Egypt after being grabbed off a Milan street, driven to a U.S. military base in northern Italy and flown to Egypt.

The case is being closely watched in Europe. The European Parliament approved a report on Wednesday saying governments helped conceal secret U.S. transfers of terrorism suspects.

A court in Munich issued arrest warrants last month for 13 suspected CIA agents accused of kidnapping a German of Lebanese descent and flying him to an Afghanistan jail, where he too says he was tortured.

The Italians linked to the Nasr case have been defending themselves tooth-and-nail, in the process making compromising statements about their American counterparts and each other.

All claim to have personally refused to help the CIA in the kidnap itself, except an Italian police officer who says he was told by the CIA's Milan station chief that the purpose was to recruit the imam as an informer -- not abduct him.

Battelli said he told the CIA chief he was on his way out of office and that the CIA should talk with his successor.

That man, Nicolo Pollari, is the highest-level Italian official facing indictment. He denies any wrongdoing.

Pollari has complained that evidence proving his innocence is being kept classified by Prime Minister Romano Prodi.

Prodi told one paper this month his government "is against any rendition but the case that you refer to concerns state secrets". Prodi, who took office in May, said the files were classified by his predecessor, Silvio Berlusconi.

Italian Deputy Prime Minister Francesco Rutelli said the government on Thursday asked Italy's constitutional court to examine whether prosecutors had violated state secrecy laws by obtaining classified documents to push their case.

"There's no intent for a controversy, it is an act that has to be taken on the part of the government," Foreign Minister Massimo D'Alema told a news conference explaining the government's move.

Nasr was released from an Egyptian prison on Sunday four years after his suspected rendition. He says he was tortured with electric shocks, beatings, rape threats and genital abuse.

"I've been reduced to a wreck of a human being," he told Italy's ANSA news agency

Foreign Policy : The Terrorism Index

The Terrorism Index

Six months ago, we launched a groundbreaking new index that asked more than 100 of America's top foreign-policy hands if the United States was winning the war on terror. Their answer? No. Now, surveyed again today, this bipartisan group sees a world that continues to grow more dangerous and a U.S. national security strategy that is failing on several fronts. In the second FOREIGN POLICY/Center for American Progress Terrorism Index, these experts warn that not only is another attack imminent, but that the United States may be distracted from the threats that matter most.

February 13, 2007

America’s leaders like to say that the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, represented a watershed. After that fateful day, Americans were told, problems that had been allowed to linger—terrorist sanctuaries, dangerous dictators, and cumbersome government bureaucracies—would no longer be neglected and left for terrorists to exploit. Yet, more than five years later, Americans are more skeptical than ever that the United States has effectively confronted the threat of terrorism. Barely half believe that their government has a plan to protect them from terrorism. Just six months ago, 55 percent of Americans approved of the way the war on terror was being handled. Today, that number is just 43 percent—lower than at practically any point since the 9/11 attacks.

That skepticism could be easily attributed to dark events in the past six months: a bloody war between Israel and Hezbollah, a plot in Britain to explode liquid bombs aboard airliners bound for the United States, North Korea’s nuclear test, a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan, and Iraq’s downward slide into deadly sectarian strife. But is the public’s pessimism over the war on terror just a problem of perception? After all, the United States has yet to be attacked again at home—and that could be the most important benchmark of all.

To help determine whether the United States is growing more or less safe, FOREIGN POLICY and the Center for American Progress teamed up once again to survey more than 100 of America’s top foreign-policy experts—Republicans and Democrats alike—in the second FOREIGN POLICY/Center for American Progress Terrorism Index. First launched last June, the Terrorism Index is the only comprehensive, nonpartisan effort to mine the highest echelons of the nation’s foreign-policy establishment for its assessment of how the United States is fighting the Global War on Terror. Its participants include people who have served as secretary of state and national security advisor, senior White House aides, top commanders in the U.S. military, seasoned intelligence officers, and distinguished academics and journalists. Eighty percent of the experts have served in the U.S. government—more than half in the executive branch, 26 percent in the military, and 18 percent in the intelligence community.

As with the first index six months ago, the results show that America’s foreign-policy community continues to have deep reservations about U.S. policies and priorities in the war on terror. Eighty-one percent see a world that is growing more dangerous for the American people, while 75 percent say the United States is losing the war on terror. Those numbers are down marginally—5 and 9 percentage points respectively—from six months ago. Yet, when asked whether President George W. Bush has a clear plan to protect the United States from terrorism, 7 in 10 experts say no—including nearly 40 percent of those who identified themselves as conservatives. More than 80 percent of the experts continue to expect a terrorist attack on the scale of 9/11 within a decade, a result that is unchanged from six months ago.

Index participants continued to criticize a number of the United States’ key national security priorities, including public diplomacy, homeland security, and energy policy. Only one policy—Iraq—received poorer reviews from the respondents than did public diplomacy. Fully 87 percent of the experts said America’s public diplomacy is failing, and nearly half said that failure is the result of poor leadership and ineffective policies. In fact, leaders and their policies apparently matter a great deal to U.S. national security. In the last index, nearly all of the departments and agencies responsible for fighting the war on terror received below-average marks. This time, however, 6 of 9 received above-average rankings, including the Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Department, both of which have welcomed new chiefs since the last index survey was conducted.

The experts did not show a similar optimism when it came to Iraq, however, even as the White House is sending in more troops. Eighty-eight percent of the experts believe that the war in Iraq is having a negative impact on U.S. national security. Just 19 percent of respondents believe that the strategy of deploying more troops in Baghdad is a good idea. Perhaps more importantly, 92 percent said that the Bush administration’s performance on Iraq has been below average, with nearly 6 in 10 experts of all political stripes saying the Bush administration is doing the “worst possible job” in Iraq.

These pessimistic conclusions would be less troubling if a majority of the experts did not also believe that Iraq is distracting the United States from more dangerous threats. More than two thirds of the experts say that Iraq is not the central front in the war on terrorism. In fact, given the choice between securing and stabilizing Iraq and ridding North Korea of its nuclear weapons, more experts say dealing with Pyongyang is the most important U.S. foreign-policy objective of the next five years. It’s a reminder that, just as America learned on September 11, the threats that are ignored are often the most dangerous.

The Wrong Surge

Afghanistan was the first front in the Global War on Terror. In the opinion of the index’s experts, it may still be the most critical. As the first deployments of the Bush administration’s ”surge” of additional combat troops arrive in Iraq, the index’s experts recommend adding U.S. forces onto a different battlefield—Afghanistan.

Asked about troop increases, only about one third of index respondents recommended increasing the number of American forces in Iraq, while 66 percent opposed an increase there. By contrast, nearly 70 percent believe that U.S. troop levels should be increased in Afghanistan.

These results may reflect the experts’ deeply pessimistic views on Iraq. Six months ago, the highest percentage of experts identified Islamist animosity as the ”one principal reason why the world is becoming more dangerous.” Now the highest percentage pinpoints Iraq. Fully 88 percent of the experts believe the war in Iraq is undermining U.S. national security. By comparison, 64 percent believe the war in Afghanistan has advanced U.S. national security goals.

The experts may also advocate a surge in Afghanistan, and not in Iraq, because they see evidence that the Afghan state is faltering—and fast. The percentage of experts who said that the war in Afghanistan has had a positive impact on U.S. national security fell some 30 points from the previous Terrorism Index published last July. They also graded the U.S government’s efforts at stabilizing and rebuilding Afghanistan as below average. With attacks against U.S. and NATO forces up 300 percent since September, and military commanders predicting a Taliban offensive this spring, sending more forces to Iraq may be the right idea in the wrong place.

Chasing the Money

It’s often said that if you want to catch a criminal, all you have to do is follow the money. Since Sept. 11, 2001, Western governments have invested countless hours chasing the money trail of international terrorist groups. And, according to the index’s experts, those efforts are working—perhaps better than any other policy initiative of the past six years.

When asked to judge the United States’ efforts at staunching the flow of terrorist money worldwide, 95 percent of the experts said that some or a great deal of progress had been made. It’s a conclusion that is apparently shared across the foreign-policy community. That could be because, in the past six years, the United States has led the charge to freeze more than $140 million in terrorist assets in 1,400 bank accounts worldwide. ”It’s worth remembering that this was the one area where the 9/11 Commission gave an A-level grade to the Bush administration. They were savvy to leverage earlier initiatives to combat financial abuse, apply them to terrorist financing, and secure broad international support,” says index participant Daniel Drezner, a professor at Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

Many may consider these efforts a success, but attacks in recent years have also served as a reminder that terrorists do not need large sums of cash to be deadly effective. The 2002 Bali bombings cost just $50,000, but they killed more than 200 people. The attacks on Madrid’s train system two years later killed nearly as many for just $10,000. Cheaper still were the London subway attacks in July 2005. They killed 52 people, injured hundreds more, and cost the terrorists less than $2,000. It’s a reminder that, even as one fight is being won, another may be just beginning.

The Dangers of Distraction

While the United States has been looking toward Iraq, a problem that could be just as serious has been growing in the hills of Afghanistan. The Taliban has regrouped. An overwhelming majority of the survey’s experts—83 percent—say that the fundamentalist Islamist group that harbored Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda while they planned and executed the September 11 attacks has strengthened in the past year. So too, they say, have other terrorist organizations in the Middle East, including Hezbollah and Hamas.

Their fears are not baseless. Last year was the bloodiest in Afghanistan since the United States overthrew the Taliban in 2001. Attacks against U.S. and NATO forces have risen fourfold in the past 12 months, with Taliban fighters adopting many of the tactics used by Iraqi insurgents. What’s worse, U.S. intelligence experts believe that al Qaeda may be collaborating with the Taliban along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, where much of its leadership retreated after 2001. ”There is extensive evidence of collaboration between al Qaeda and key Taliban-allied leaders,” says index participant Steve Coll, a historian of Afghanistan and staff writer at The New Yorker. ”Among other things, al Qaeda seems to be encouraging or training the Taliban to carry out suicide attacks and to employ more deadly improvised explosive devices.”

The experts’ opinions bear out these concerns. When asked to choose the country most likely to become the next al Qaeda stronghold, Pakistan came in second, just behind Somalia. And 91 percent of the participants believe that the United States must increase pressure dramatically on Pakistan to confront militants in the tribal areas. As the events of Sept. 11, 2001, should have taught us, just because a problem is out of sight doesn’t mean it should be out of mind.

Priority No. 1

The United States has reportedly reached a deal that may put the cap on North Korea’s nuclear program. If the deal sticks, according to the index’s experts, it couldn’t have happened a moment too soon.

The Hermit Kingdom, which tested an underground nuclear weapon last October, ranked among the experts’ highest concerns. When asked to choose the most important U.S. foreign-policy objective to achieve in the next five years, 26 percent—the largest among the survey’s experts—said eliminating North Korea’s nukes is the most important task facing U.S. foreign policymakers. In fact, denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula finished ahead of securing and stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan, creating a national missile defense system, and convincing Iran to abandon its uranium enrichment program.

A deal on disarming North Korea’s nukes is welcome news. That’s because, across the board, the experts said that U.S. policy toward Pyongyang wasn’t working. Asked whether the United States’ current policy toward North Korea was having a positive or negative impact on America’s national security, nearly three quarters of the experts said they believed it was failing.

The stakes for this new nuclear deal couldn’t be higher. Not only did more than 1 in 3 experts say that Pyongyang is the world’s most dangerous regime—second only to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s Iran—but an overwhelming majority also believe that Kim Jong Il is likely to follow in the footsteps of A.Q. Khan, the Pakistani scientist who sold his country’s nuclear secrets on the open market. Seventy-three percent of the experts said that North Korea is the country most likely to transfer nuclear technology in the next three to five years. That scenario certainly makes North Korea priority No. 1.

The Public’s Perception

The Terrorism Index’s experts have had a hand in running America’s national-security apparatus. Perhaps it’s that experience that has led them to see the world as a more dangerous place than many Americans. Although nearly half of Americans believe they are safer today than they were before the 9/11 attacks, only 12 percent of the experts agree. Likewise, nearly half of Americans believe the United States is winning the war on terror; only 16 percent of the experts are as optimistic. Here’s a look at where the index’s experts and the American public part ways.

see the CHARTS at the LINK

Daily Gazette (Schenectady) : The View From Here

THE VIEW FROM HERE

Carl Strock | February 4, 2007

As the Albany Muslim men targeted by the FBI await sentencing, I visited one of them, Yassin Aref, at the Rensselaer County Jail the other day to see how he is preparing himself for the possibility of spending the rest of his life in prison and what he is thinking and feeling.

I found him full of life in his own way––talkative, analytical, and thoughtful.

"If they want to put me life in prison, they can do it," he said in his imperfect but rapidly improving English, "but I have one question: Why? I think they know I did nothing in my entire life…I did not participate in any violence, and especially I never did anything against America."

He is a 36-year-old Kurdish refugee from Iraq who was sent to this country seven years ago as part of a United Nations resettlement program. He has a wife and four young children in legal limbo in Albany. He was found guilty of nine counts of supporting terrorism as the result of an elaborate sting operation run by the FBI, and he is scheduled to be sentenced a week from tomorrow in federal court. The government is asking for a sentence of at least 30 years to life, which if he got, he would probably have to spend at a "supermax" prison in the Midwest.

Is he scared?

No, he said, "I’m not scared any more. I’ll take it, even the death penalty...I am 100 percent sure, the judge, the jury, the FBI, they know I am innocent. They saw everything, they knew everything. I am a victim for their own policy, that’s all, to show people they are fighting terrorists."

An assessment, by the way, that I basically agree with. The FBI needed to show it was on top of the terrorism threat, and as the bearded imam of a local mosque, he was a convenient showpiece, even though there was nothing radical about him, much less terroristic.

What would be fair?

"If they want to be fair they must apologize to my children and let me go back to my family, but if they want to hang me, I’ll take it proudly," he said as we sat in a small conference room at the jail talking over a metal table.

He does not much focus on himself and the wreck that his life has become in his adopted country. "I’m one person," he said. "Maybe 700,000 died in Iraq. Most saw no trial, no court."

"If not for wife and children," he said, "I have no problem. I sit and read a book. This is punishment for them. Their life has been destroyed more than my life."

Sitting and reading a book is something he has plenty of time for. Since his bail was revoked in September 2005 he has been in so-called protective custody, meaning solitary confinement, locked into his one-man cell 23 hours a day, allowed out only for a daily shower and a visit to a recreation yard, which, until his co-defendant joined him in October 2006, was a solo visit. Plus he gets an hour a week of religion class and an hour a week of group prayer, which, however, he is not allowed to lead.

He is behind a steel door, with a small window onto the cellblock at eye level and a small grate at knee level. He is in there with a bunk, a toilet, a sink, a locker and a desk. "I keep myself busy with mainly three things," he told me. "Prayer and holy book; books and reading; and listening to news."

He is allowed to have a small radio with earphones, and he listens a lot to National Public Radio, and especially to a program by Amy Goodman, "Democracy Now." He wants to tell Amy Goodman, "If not your program and my holy book, I lost my mind."

And, oh yes, "I sing a lot, and I sleep too. I cry sometimes, too."

The songs are his own compositions, in Kurdish, 30 of them so far. And of course the tears are his own.

He has also busied himself writing his life story, some of which I have read, including the parts about his childhood in a hard-scrabble village of the mountains of northern Iraq where food was so scarce that he remembers his father often saying, when asked what he would like to eat, that he would take anything softer than stones.

He reminded me of that when I asked him how the food was in jail. "I have no complaint about the food," he said. "In Iraq many days we could not even get bread to eat. I saw people eat leaves of tree"––during Saddam Hussein’s war of extermination against the Kurds. "This helps me now enjoy the food, whatever it is."

With only another week left before he learns his fate, he is not without hope. "When the U.N. sent me to this country, I hope the judge proves they did not send me to the wrong country," he said, pointing up one of the many ironies of this case––that he did not choose to come here. When he was going to be relocated from Syria, where he had sought refuge with his new wife from the turmoil in his homeland, his preference was for Europe, where there were more Kurds and he figured he would have an easier time fitting in.

He got shipped here willy-nilly, and right away did what so many new immigrants do, get a low-level job and start learning English. He worked as a janitor at Albany Medical Center, studied hard and soon became the prayer leader, or imam, at a storefront mosque on Central Avenue.

Then 9/11 happened, and one of the ways the world changed was the FBI got a new mandate: Find terrorists before they can strike again.

Yassin Aref was not a terrorist or anything close to a terrorist, nor was Mohammed Hossain, from Bangladesh, running a pizza shop. But they were bearded Muslim men, the FBI had Yassin’s name from someone’s address book in Iraq, which they took as ominous, and the FBI went after the two of them, sending a Pakistani snitch to try to dupe them into exchanging cash for checks in such a way that it could be construed as supporting an attack on the Pakistani consulate in New York, something there is no evidence that either man had ever dreamed of.

It worked, or at least it worked to the extent that the government was able to sell it to a jury, and now here they are, both officially guilty of crimes that could put them away for the rest of their lives, and both waiting for the final word from the judge.

I wish I could do something about all of this.

OTHER DEFENDANT

In case you’re wondering why I interviewed only Yassin Aref and not his co-defendant, Mohammed Hossain, the answer is that Yassin’s lawyer gave permission for an interview, which the jail requires, and Hossain’s lawyer did not. But you should not read anything into that.

Lawyers generally don’t want their clients to talk to the press, lest they say something damaging, and in this case, one lawyer made one call, and the other lawyer made another, that’s all. I wanted to talk to both of them, and I wish them both well, equally.

Carl Strock can be reached at 395-3085 or by e-mail at carlstrock@dailygazette.com